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“Accountability: Market forces play a major role in correctional companies providing the best 
services and management of prison facilities. Should a contractor not perform, they put 
themselves in a position to lose business”  
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CORRECTIONS CORPORATION OF AMERICA IRRESPONSIBILITY 
 




Britney Anne Majure 
 
University of New Hampshire, September, 2016 
 
 
Prison reformists, lawmakers, human rights activists, lobbyists, investors, government agencies, and 
other civil and government actors play a large role in the state of the private prison industry’s rate of 
growth, especially in the past 15-20 years. A 2001 Bureau of Justice Statistics study concluded that 
big cost savings promised by the private prison industry in the United States “have not 
materialized.”2 Corrections Corporation of America’s stock price took its largest plunge in 2000 and 
never bounced back to its late 90s high.3 However, despite successful divestment campaigns and 
legislation against prison privatization after reports of irresponsibility, CCA stock has issued 
dividends to their investors since 2012,4 and several analysts currently list CXW (CCA stock) as a 
recommended buy and hold.5 Although the United States federal prison population dropped in 2014 
for the first time since 1980 (along with private populations), CCA’s stock price remains relatively 
the same today as the day Attorney General Eric Holder made the announcement.6 Since the fall of 
                                                 
2
 U.S. Department of Justice. Emerging Issues on Privatized Prisons. Bureau of Justice Assistance. February 2001. 
accessed April 23, 2015. https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/bja/181249.pdf. 
3
 All stock prices taken from Google Finance. 
4
 CCA company reports. 
5
 Zack’s Stock Ratings, http://www.zacks.com/stock/quote/CXW. 
6
 U.S. Department of Justice. One Year After Launching Key Sentencing Reforms, Attorney General Eric Holder 




share prices, CCA has converted to a REIT in order to avoid corporate taxes and focused heavily on 
litigating and lobbying to influence voting decisions on sentencing, regulations, and law 
enforcement. This lobbying assists in filling prison beds and winning government contracts, with 
lobbying expenditures over $3.3 million in 2005.7 With respect to economic, social, and political 
indicators and by juxtaposing the theories of Adam Smith, Milton Friedman, and Karl Polanyi this 
study will focus on whether CXW investors can influence the re-embedding of the economy (the 
subordination of the markets to social relations),8 with a quantitative focus on the fluctuation of 
CXW stock prices and their relationship to reports of CCA irresponsibility in the media.   
                                                 
7
 “Corrections Corporation of America.” Opensecrets.org. accessed May 1, 2016. 
https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/clientsum.php?id=D000021940&year=2016. 
8
 Polanyi, Karl. The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time. 1944. 3
rd
 ed. Boston: 
Beacon Press, 2001. viii. 
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Why markets and private prisons? The gathering and testing of theories are often provoked 
by personal experiences and “everyday reasoning and common sense”. 9  From 2009-2012, I 
conducted research in Norwegian prisons and observed public prisons humanely rehabilitating 
individuals in a manner that also assists in lowering rates of recidivism. After moving back to the 
United States and considering the high incarceration rates and recidivism in my own country, I began 
to question what actors are involved in the rate of progress of the system and whether privatization is 
helping or hurting, with respect to human rights and reducing inmate populations. Considering 
personal common sense, it appeared that imprisoning persons in a profit driven market will only raise 
imprisonment rates, encourage a society to incarcerate more individuals, and drop human rights 
standards with respect to costs. In my graduate research at the University of New Hampshire, I 
focused on the largest private prison enterprise, Corrections Corporation of America, the company’s 
effects on the corrections industry, and what survival techniques the entity has employed in their 30+ 
year history.  
Lobbying is an important survival tool for CCA, as they strive to increase populations 
(through sentencing and law enforcement), reduce regulations, and win government contracts. For 
example, CCA almost doubled their lobbying expenditures from 2001 to 2002, $470,000 to 
$850,000, and in turn CCA’s federal contract amounts increased over five folds in subsequent years 
afterwards, $30,740,866 in 2002 to $161,472,185 in 2003.10 With the upswing of neoliberalism and 
privatization in the 1980s arises contract, lobbying, and accounting mechanisms in favor of 
sentencing and policy changes benefiting private corrections companies. Private prison companies 
can now “serve as vehicles for backdoor financing,” as they wheel and deal in many ways in order to 
                                                 
9
 Neuman, W. Lawrence. Basics of Social Research:  Qualitative and Quantitative Approaches. Pearson August 5, 
2011. 
10
 Lobbying figures were taken from Opensecrets.org, and government contract amounts were taken from 
Fedspending.org. 
 x 
keep the prison debts off of their books and push the risks back onto the public sector.11 CCA’s 
conversion to a Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT) in 2013 is a prime example of the entity’s smart 
business methods of avoiding taxes while partaking in government contracts funded by public tax 
revenues. 
CCA spends millions of dollars each year lobbying in order to influence voting decisions that 
will affect how humane they must function with respect to regulations, and whether or not they will 
fill their prison beds and make a profit.12 In Karl Polanyi’s 1944 work The Great Transformation, the 
economic sociologist tells us the capitalistic markets desire a disembedded economy, or an economy 
without regulations, and they attempt to influence politicians to pursue this goal.13 Polanyi also states 
there is a double movement, where the market expands continuously by disembedding but is met by a 
countermovement (government) that checks its expansion by re-embedding the economy.  
In prior research, I found a significant relationship between CXW stock prices and the 
percentage of custody population held under private custody. My quantitative results displayed that a 
rise in CXW stock price can predict a rise in the percentage of custody population in private custody 
in that same year. 14  Considering these results and the dramatic history of CXW stock price 
fluctuations, my research began to question whether or not investors could play a role in this 
countermovement (or re-embedding), and whether or not these results would assist Polanyi’s theories 
or in fact defend the classical economists like Milton Friedman’s notion of self-regulating markets. 
This thesis tests whether stock prices are affected by media reports of CCA irresponsibility.
                                                 
11
 Herivel, Tara J., Kevin Pranis, et al. Prison Profiteers:  Who Makes Money from Mass Incarceration. New York: 
The New Press, 2008. 
12
 “Corrections Corporation of America.” Opensecrets.org. accessed May 1, 2016. 
https://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/clientsum.php?id=D000021940&year=2016. 
13
 Polanyi, Karl. 1944. 
14





Corrections Corporation of America opens the company code of conduct with the 
Chinese proverb “Clear conscience never fears midnight knocking.”15 They emphasize to their 
investors they are both “socially responsible and a strong corporate citizen.” 16  The private 
correction entity’s website is full of promises, not only to investors, but commitments to 
“stakeholders and others who may be interested” in their business.17 How does CCA hold up to 
these claims? According to a 2003 Corporate Research Project of Good Jobs First report, CCA 
has been “widely vilified for poor management practices” and “abuse, violence, and escapes.”18 
Investors hold influence over corporate social behavior with voting power in shareholder 
meetings and investment actions, such as choosing whether or not to invest in shares of a 
company stock after media reports of irresponsibility. With respect to CCA investors, how do 
they respond for instance when The New York Times reports on a history of “unnamed and 
uncounted” deaths in a CCA immigrant facility?19  
There are competing theories which try to explain an individual’s behavior in market 
transactions. This study tests which of these theories is evident in the behavior of those investing 
in the private prison industry by examining the relationship between media reports of 
irresponsibility under CCA custody and CCA stock prices. By juxtaposing the theories of Adam 
Smith, Milton Friedman, and Karl Polanyi, this study asks whether investor decisions can be 
                                                 
15




 “Investor FAQs.” Corrections Corporation of America. accessed March 23, 2016. 
https://www.cca.com/investors/faq. 
17




 Mattera, Philip, Mafruza Khan, and Stephen Nathan. “Corrections Corporation of America: A Critical Look at its 
First Twenty Years.” Corporate Research Project of Good Jobs First. May 2003. 
http://www.prisonpolicy.org/scans/grassrootsleadership/cca.pdf. 
19
 Bernstein, Nina. “Deaths in Immigration Detention.” The New York Times January 9, 2010. accessed March 24, 
2016. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/10/us/10detain.html?_r=0. 
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used as tool of the markets to self-regulate, calling into question Smith and Friedman’s theories 
of a self-regulating market 20  and Polanyi’s theories concerning the double movement. 21  The 
research question is the following: How do reported claims of corruption and human rights 
abuses affect the speculative value of CCA stock, and which economic theory do these findings 
support? If Polanyi’s fictitious commodities, land, labor, and capital, are in fact protected 
through the market self-adjusting (investors not investing or selling after reports of abuse), then 
there is no need for a double movement (the intervention of the government with regulations 
after the market fails to self-regulate). It is predicted in this research that reports of CCA abuses 
are correlated with changes in the price of CXW stock shares, and investors view CCA 
irresponsibility as ‘bad for business’ and will sell or choose to not invest after the reportings. Are 
investors commoditizing land, labor, and capital as Polanyi suggests, or are they responding to 
these reports and using their self-interests to regulate and assist in re-embedding the economy 
with social protections, making the need for state protection unnecessary?  
Most CCA company shares are owned by corporate entities.22 Therefore, it is important to 
note this research considered that the intentions and the conscience of an individual differ greatly 
from a corporate entity. However, regardless of the intentions of the investor and CCA, which 
classical and neo-classical economists would state are profit maximization and self-interest, 
thriving markets are deeply embedded in society according to Polanyi. To what degree can 
media reports affect the bottom line, especially in an industry where investors are aware they are 
buying into the concept of imprisoning society for profit? This study researches how claims of 
corruption and human rights abuses affect the speculative value of CCA and investor behavior 
                                                 
20
 Friedman, Milton. Capitalism and Freedom. University of Chicago Press, 1962. 
21
 Polanyi, Karl. 1944. 
22
Welch, Michael and Fatiniyah Turner. “Private Corrections, Financial Infrastructure, and Transportation: The New 
Geo-Economy of Shipping Prisoners.” Social Justice 34.3/4 (2007-2008): 56-77. 
 3 
and whether these findings will support Smith and Friedman’s theories of a self-regulating 
market. 
While it is clear that there are moral implications for this study the research does not 
necessarily ask a moral question. This research does not necessarily consider investor intentions, 
as this is an entire field of studies already covered heavily by scholarship. However, after 
reviewing the lack of scholarship examining the behavior of investors of the private prison 
industry, I strive to demonstrate whether or not these particular investor actions in the private 
prison stock market are correlated with reports of CCA abuses in the media, regardless of the 
intentions of that investor being socially conscious or self-interested in profit maximization. 
Under the assumption that investors of prison stock are some of the less socially conscious 
investors in the market, this study found it interesting to view them as indirect actors in the field 
of human rights, whether they are aware of this possibility, or not. 
After reviewing the history of Western privatization, private prisons, and CCA as a 
public company with the assistance of past scholarship, this study will describe the results found 
in a quantitative multivariate time series analysis of CXW stock prices in comparison to media 
reports of CCA abuses and whether investor actions can indirectly hold CCA socially 
responsible through market actions alone. 
 
 4 
Background and Literature Review 
Before approaching the methodology and findings of the quantitative research, it is 
helpful to survey the background and theory provoking and surrounding this research. First I will 
review the history of Western privatization and privatized corrections and the formation of the 
Corrections Corporation of America and its company stock, while considering past scholarship 
and some analysis of privatization and privatized corrections. While many studies since the 
worldwide spread of privatization in the 1980s and 90s have focused on evaluating policies and 
privatized practices, few have chosen to study why privatized policies developed so rapidly since 
the birth of neoliberalism.23 Empirical research concerning what practices the private prison 
industry has utilized to flourish in the past few decades is lacking in particular. Additionally, 
arguments for (and even against) free markets often “pay no attention to the social consequences 
of the doctrines.”24 I would like future research to incorporate this study into a comparison of 
incarceration rates and other social consequences. While touching on evaluations of privatized 
practices, this review of privatization and economic literature will focus on the rise of 
neoliberalism and privatization in the West, with a particular focus on how privatized corrections 
evolved and survives today. 
This study will also present examples of reported and documented CCA irresponsibility 
and what mechanisms hold the corrections entity accountable. What laws and organizations 
regulate private corrections, and how is CCA held accountable for their actions? This thesis will 
argue that CCA has used corporate social responsibility mechanisms and lobbying as their main 
tools for survival against the negative reports and court filings against them. 
                                                 
23
 Yarrow, George. “A Theory of Privatization or Why Bureaucrats are Still in Business.” World Development 27.1 
(1999): 157-168. 
24
 Stiglitz, Joseph E. Foreword. The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time. By 
Karl Polanyi. 1944. 3
rd
 ed. Boston: Beacon Press, 2001. viii. 
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This section will also highlight some competing theories that attempt to explain an 
individual’s behavior in market transactions and whether these theories assist in explaining the 
behavior of CCA and their investors. Before presenting evidence from the multivariate times 
series analysis concerning which of these theories is evident in the behavior of private prison 
industry investors, I will explore Adam Smith’s theories concerning privatization and self-
interest,25 Milton Friedman’s neoliberal theories of a self-regulating market,26 and Karl Polanyi’s 
theories concerning the double movement.27  
 
The Birth of Western Privatization, Prison Privatization, and Neoliberalism 
Privatization28 as an alternative to inefficiencies of the state dates at least to classical 
antiquity. Although the ancient Greeks and Romans contracted out the majority of services to the 
private sector,
29
 some scholars blame the fall of the Roman Empire on the costs of bureaucracy.
30
 
Comparative-historical research identifies many scholars wringing their hands, mulling over the 
privatization debate and whether public or private ownership of public goods and services is 
best, economically and socially speaking. The rise of human rights post-Enlightenment31 and 
labor rights post-Industrialism 32  brought more attention to the individuals involved in these 
private practices and the need for regulations. Government and public interest in privatization 
has waxed and waned historically, with most recent research focused on whether or not costs are 
                                                 
25
 Smith, Adam. The Wealth of Nations. New York: Bantam Dell, 1776. 
26
 Friedman, Milton. Capitalism and Freedom. University of Chicago Press, 1962. 
27
 Polanyi, Karl. 1944. 
28 Defined in the Definitions section of this paper as “the transfer of ownership of business, services, or property 
from the public sector to the private sector, or the government contracting out, or outsourcing services to a private 
entity.” 
29
 Parker, David and David S. Saal. International Handbook on Privatization. Edward Elgar, 2003. 25-6. citing:  
Robert Sobel, The Pursuit of Wealth. New York:  McGraw-Hill, 1999. 
30
 Bartlett, Bruce. “How Excessive Government Killed Ancient Rome.” Cato Journal 14.2. (Fall 1994): 287-303. 
accessed May 5, 2015. http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/cato-journal/1994/11/cj14n2-7.pdf. 
31
 Hunt, Lynn. Inventing Human Rights: A History. W.W. Norton & Company, 2007. 40. 
32
 Upton Sinclair, Karl Marx, and Lewis Hines are only a few of the many writers who can be referenced for a 
history of labor rights in the West. 
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reduced under private ownership and/or operation. Prisons, postal services, utilities, tax 
collection, health care, police, and even education are all services that have been put up for 
debate considering the degree of responsibility of the state to be the caretaker. It is generally 
excepted now that prisons and other public institutions being run by for-profit firms are “ways to 
make public services more competitive.”33 There is also general consensus about the importance 
of government regulation, but the argument lies within the best way this is done.34 With that said, 
there are important differences among scholars’ views. Some are easy to disregard with 
“ideology and special interests masquerading as economic science and good policy,”35 especially 
with respect to policy studies concerning the private prison market, where a study could assist or 
hurt CCA from receiving the next government contract.  
This thesis concerns privatization arguments beginning with classical economics works 
written during the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, as this is also the beginnings of joint-
stock trading and laissez-faire economics (mid-18
th
 century to present). Early (and even modern 
day) arguments for privatization concern how nations could build wealth selling government 
property publically. This can be found in classical British economy literature, such as the 1776 
writings of Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations: 
In every great monarchy of Europe the sale of the crown lands would produce 
a very large sum of money, which, if applied to the payment of the public 
debts, would deliver from mortgage a much greater revenue than any which 
those lands have ever afforded to the crown. In countries where lands, 
improved and cultivated very highly, and yielding at the time of sale as great 
                                                 
33
 Singer, P.W. Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2001. 7, 213. 
34
 Stiglitz, 2001. viii. 
35
 Stiglitz. 2001. viii. 
 7 
a rent as can easily be got from them, commonly sell at thirty years' purchase, 
the unimproved, uncultivated, and low-rented crown lands might well be 
expected to sell at forty, fifty, or sixty years' purchase. The crown might 
immediately enjoy the revenue which this great price would redeem from 
mortgage. In the course of a few years it would probably enjoy another 
revenue. When the crown lands had become private property, they would, in 
the course of a few years, become well improved and well cultivated.36  
The people play a large role in Smith’s notion of the nation building wealth, with revenue 
increases deriving from “consumption of the people” and government expenses being “defrayed 
by taxes.”37 In Smith’s point of view, privatizing the government lands would benefit society: 
The revenue which, in any civilised monarchy, the crown derives from the 
crown lands, though it appears to cost nothing to individuals, in reality costs 
more to the society than perhaps any other equal revenue which the crown 
enjoys. It would, in all cases, be for the interest of the society to replace this 
revenue to the crown by some other equal revenue, and to divide the lands 
among the people, which could not well be done better, perhaps, than by 
exposing them to public sale.  
Smith places a limit on the privatization of government property by stating that “land for 
the purposes of pleasure and magnificence – parks, gardens, public walks, etc.” which are 
“considered as causes of expense, not as sources of revenue” should be “the only lands 
                                                 
36
 Smith, Adam. 1776. 1041. 
37
 Smith, Adam. 1776. 1041-1042. 
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which…belong to the crown.”38 This stages the future of Western governments contracting out or 
selling property that will draw revenue and then taxing individuals for the use of property owned 
and maintained by the government. These lines are often blurred, as for example, CCA also 
benefits from public tax through the awarding of government contracts. 
At what point in history does the privatization of corrections arise? Prison studies expert 
Charles Campbell dates privatized imprisonment to the convict leasing system, which originally 
involved private parties responsible for the detainment and care of prisoners at the end of the 
American Revolution. Under this system, after a battle ended, elites loaded society ills onto 
hulks, which then became prison ships.
39
 Private sector involvement in the American prison 
industry emerged at the end of slavery and the American Civil War, when workforces needed 
supplementation
40  during America’s Second Industrial Revolution. This penal labor practice 
peaked around 1880, but was abolished in 1942 by President Franklin D. Roosevelt, partly due to 
human rights concerns. In place of this system emerges a more concrete version of private 
contracting, which the American, Australian, British, and other English speaking governments 
and private prison companies utilized extensively after President Ronald Reagan’s declaration of 
the “War on Drugs” in the 1980s.41  
The birth of neoliberalism with its laissez-faire economics advanced privatization in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s, “a revolutionary turning-point in the world’s social and economic 
                                                 
38
 Smith, Adam. 1776. 1042. 
39
 Campbell, Charles. The Intolerable Hulks. Heritage Books, 1993. 
40
 Lichtenstein, Alex. Twice the Work of Free Labour: The Political Economy of Convict Labour in the New South. 
Verso Press, 1996. 
41
 The 1970s and 80s witnessed the Nixon and Reagan Administrations “War on Drugs,” which is defined 
differently by opposing parties concerning drug policy debate. According to Human Rights Watch, Nixon’s “War on 
Drugs” caused soaring arrest rates. However, the most dramatic increase of incarceration begins post-1980. In the 
1980s, while the number of arrests for all crimes had risen by 28%, the number of arrests for drug offenses rose 
126%, according to Austin J. McVey AD’s The 1989 NCCD Prison Population Forecast: The Impact of The War on 
Drugs. 
 9 
history.” 42 Paul Volcker changed monetary policy dramatically while in control of the U.S. 
Federal Reserve, and thereafter the Fed fought against inflation disregarding many of its 
consequences (in particular concerning unemployment). Margaret Thatcher became Prime 
Minister of the United Kingdom in May 1979, with an initiative to curtail trade union power and 
end the flationary stagnation that took over the country in the preceding administrations. Ronald 
Reagan took office in the United States in 1980 with the goal of saving the American economy 
by backing up Volcker’s actions at the Fed and “adding his own particular blend of policies to 
curb the power of labour, deregulate industry, agriculture, and resource extraction, and liberate 
the powers of finance both internally and on the world stage.”43 Reagan and Thatcher profoundly 
boosted privatization in the 1980s, giving way to increasing numbers of Western government 
contracts with private industries for the delivery of public goods and services. These contracts 
involved everyone from private military and security firms to competitive energy and utility 
suppliers. The boom in private prisons in the 1980s and 90s was not only an American one, the 
debate and implementation of “governments contracting with private firms to operate and even 
own prisons, jails, and other places of imprisonment,” was also happening at this time in 
Australia, the United Kingdom, and other English-speaking countries. 44  The Neoliberalism 
Philosophies section of this thesis (p. 42) will present arguments concerning why neoliberalism 




                                                 
42
 Harvey, David. A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford University Press, 2005. 2. 
43
 Harvey, David. 2005. 2. 
44
 McDonald, Douglas C. “Public Imprisonment By Private Means: The Re-emergence of Private Prisons and Jails 
in the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia.” The British Journal of Criminology (1994): 34. 29-48. 
accessed May 2, 2015. http://www.jstor.org/stable/23638186. 
 10 
Evaluations of Prison Privatization 
Most findings identified in this literature review utilize a “comparative efficiency 
approach,”45 concerning whether public or private prisons are more efficient with respect to 
price. Geoffrey Segal and Adrian T. Moore’s 2002 study for the Reason Public Policy Institute, a 
libertarian think tank, is often cited, which evaluated 28 private prison cost studies and found 
that “virtually all of them found private prisons to provide significantly lower cost – on average 
between five and 15 percent.”46 However, this research found it most important to emphasize 
studies of why private prisons arose and why so rapidly, as these studies assist in studying the 
effects of neoliberalism and investor actions on the health of the private prison industry. A major 
question of this study lies in the social costs of privatization methods and the actors that 
influence the state of prison privatization. Malcolm Feeley’s 2014 research maintained that 
theories asserting “privatization is inconsistent with the modern state” are erroneous, and he 
concluded with “a call for policymakers and judges to imbue their future privatization decisions 
with local knowledge and time-honored pragmatism.”47 
Periodicals also often point to the “perverse incentives”48 of privately run prison systems, 
where the more prisoners a company houses, the more it gets paid, leading to a conflict of 
interest on behalf of the private entities which, in theory, are not motivated to rehabilitate 
prisoners. Private prison opponents infer that, “if private prisons worked to reduce the number of 
                                                 
45
 Dolovich, Sharon. “State Punishment and Private Prisons.” Duke Law Journal Vol. 55. No. 3. 437-546. December 
2005. 
46
 Segal, Geoffrey and Adrian T. Moore. “Weighing the Watchmen: Evaluating the Costs and Benefits of 
Outsourcing Correctional Services.” Reason Public Policy Institute. Policy Study (2002): 289. 
47
 Feeley, Malcolm M. “The Unconvincing Case Against Private Prisons.” Indiana Law Journal 89.4.3. (Fall 2014): 
accessed May 3, 2015. http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol89/iss4/3/. 
48
 W.W. “The Perverse Incentives of Private Prisons.” The Economist August 24, 2010. 
http://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2010/08/private_prisons. 
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repeat offenders, they would be in effect reducing the supply of profit-producing inmates.”49 
According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, the imprisonment rate of sentenced prisoners under 
the jurisdiction of state or federal correctional authorities per 100,000 U.S. residents went from 
187 in 1984 to 500 in 2010,
50
 while private prison populations rose to 8% of total prison 
populations by 2010.
51
 With the upswing of privatization in the 1980s arises contract, lobbying, 
and accounting mechanisms in favor of sentencing and policy changes benefiting private 
corrections companies, according to critics of privatization. Kevin Pranis states in Prison 
Profiteers that private prison companies can “serve as vehicles for backdoor financing,” as they 
wheel and deal in many ways in order to keep the prison debts off of their books and push the 
risks back onto the public sector.
52
  
This research identified several scholars also considering this current model of privately 
run corrections in the United States insufficient with respect to public and social values. Award-
winning Columbia University professor Elliott Sclar’s book You Don’t Always Get What You 
Pay For gives the pros and cons of privatization in American business. He argues that almost all 
public institutions and agencies in America are fair game for privatization; however, he reminds 
readers that one does not need to be corrupt in order to botch public contracting. Sclar calls on 
taxpayers and politicians to realize that poorly managed privatization can often collide with vital 
public values and that privatization is often only pitfalls and promises.
53 
 
Regarding efficiency, research findings exist for most possible outcomes, as there does 
not appear to be a general consensus regarding which facilities are more efficient and financially 
                                                 
49
 Ritter, Michael J. “Resolved:  For-profit prisons in the United States should be banned.” The Forensic Files 
December 2014. accessed April 20, 2015, http://debateon.weebly.com/uploads/7/8/2/2/7822220/tff.pfd.dec.14.pdf. 
50
 Bureau of Justice Statistics, http://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=nps. 
51
 Mason, Cody. “Too Good To Be True.” The Sentencing Project, January 2012. accessed April 19, 2015, 
http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc_Too_Good_to_be_True.pdf. 
52
 Herivel, Tara J. Prison Profiteers:  Who Makes Money from Mass Incarceration. 2008: 38-9. 
53
 Sclar., Elliott D. You Don’t Always Get What You Pay For. Cornell University Press. November 29, 2001. 
 12 
sound, public or private.; however, as mentioned earlier, Segal and Moore’s 2002 study for the 
libertarian think tank Reason Public Policy Institute is often cited stating that all of private 
prisons studied “provide significantly lower cost – on average between five and 15 percent.” 54 
Andrei Shleifer argued in 1998 that “private ownership should generally be preferred to public 
ownership when the incentives to innovate and to contain costs must be strong.” 55  James 
Blumstein, director of the Health Policy Center at the Vanderbilt Institute for Public Policy 
Studies, found that states that used private prisons could possibly save up to $15 million per 
year.
56
 However, research presented by Ruth Wilson Gilmore in Golden Gulag, a 2007 analysis 
of the California prison boom, states private prison companies have not been found to be 
financially stable.
57
 Interesting here is the fact that one of the founders of CCA is a Vanderbilt 
alumni, and CCA lists other Vanderbilt “independent” studies supporting prison privatization on 
their website.58 Additionally, Gilmore is deeply rooted in the prison abolition movement, even 
winning the Angela Y. Davis prize,59 which signifies her less than objective approach on the 
topic of prisons. As stated earlier, several studies identified are clearly “ideology and special 
interests masquerading as economic science and good policy.”60  
The U.S. Department of Justice was hesitant for many years to comment on the cost 
saving measures or quality of privately run facilities. The DOJ's Bureau of Justice Assistance 
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established in its 2001 research that “to date, the limited experience with privately managed 
prisons does not allow a thorough evaluation of public and private prisons in terms of overall 
quality of inmate services.”61 However, the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics did identify there 
were little cost-savings when it compared public and private prisons in their research in 2001.
62
 
This is perhaps because simple numbers do not give the entire picture, and the research does not 
generally involve more complicated quantitative criticisms of private prisons until around the 
turn of the century. For example, privately run prisons can refuse to take in certain expensive 
prisoners, and they regularly do this, which in turn artificially deflates the costs associated with 
running a private jail or prison. 
New York Times journalist Paul Krugman is one of the many hard critics of private 
prisons and government contracting. In a recent 2015 op-ed, he evaluates the economics 
concerning prison privatization in New Jersey and elsewhere. It mentions Chris Christie’s 
lobbying background and his ties to private prison companies, and the opinion that Corrections 
Corporation of America and others are not competing in a free market. Krugman attributes their 
profits to “living off government contracts.”63 
Gerald G. Gaes at Florida State University conducted the most current analysis of private 
prison research that surveys several studies in 2010, stating that despite the importance of the 
topic, “there are very few studies comparing privately and publically operated facilities.” In 2009 
in fact, Lundahl et. al. “only identified 12 studies of cost and quality meeting their criteria for 
sound methodology.” Gaes reviewed 5 of these studies and found that three concluded no 
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difference between cost and quality between private and public, and two concluded that private 
prisons are cheaper to operate and produce a similar level of quality.64 
It simply comes down to most studies found were supported by a biased agenda, whether 
that be a libertarian, conservative one or one associated with social liberalism. In efforts to weed 
through these findings, this research drew upon classical theory and literature, finding some of 
the biased think tanks also reflect on these theories, using them to make their arguments. In the 
next section, I will evaluate one of the think tanks releasing reports that support privatizing 
prisons and the legitimacy of their theoretical base as a prime example of the biasm uncovered in 
this research.  
 
ASI, Adam Smith, and Prison Privatization 
In 1984, the free market libertarian think tank Adam Smith Institute argued that private 
prisons would use “manpower more effectively” than government-run facilities.65 The institute 
openly supports privately built and managed prisons as treating prisoners “humanely (and at a 
lower cost)” and performing better “on every key measure” than public ones. According to a 
2000 blog entry found on the institute’s website, CCA was “the first US prison service, public or 
private, to win a national accreditation sponsorship for its vocational trades courses,” which 
helps offenders with “a much wider choice of jobs once they are released.”66 
How would Adam Smith view the ASI’s hardline support for privatization of corrections? 
It appears Smith would be in favor of the privatization of corrections if individuals would draw 
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revenue from this practice, which Smith theorizes will in turn assist society. However, in his later 
work The Theory of Moral Sentiments, he suggests private demand for punishment as being 
independent of conversations concerning social gain. 67  It is only through the lens of an 
organization dedicated to Adam Smith where one can possibly see what the theorist would state 
today on the privatization of prisons, or is it really? 
According to Barak Orbach’s research of Adam Smith scholarship, the intellectual basis 
of invisible hand theories is derived from a misreading of Adam Smith,.68 “Although critical of 
government regulation, Smith’s invisible hand was the hand of God, not of market forces.”69 The 
ASI was formed in 1977 in the United Kingdom in an effort to assist the neoliberal agenda of 
privatizing state-owned businesses while Margaret Thatcher was leader of the opposition party in 
Parliament and soon to be Prime Minister of the United Kingdom. The policies of Margaret 
Thatcher and United States President Ronald Reagan greatly advanced the neoliberal agenda and 
assisted in the privatization of corrections in the United States and the United Kingdom. Could 
the ASI be possibly manipulating Adam Smith’s original thesis for the benefit of the neoliberal 
agenda? 
It can also be questioned how Adam Smith would view modern day forms of corporate 
control of security and justice, as in his times he feared the dynamics of joint-stock companies 
where directors are not the actual owners of the money, therefore lacking interest in how the 
funds are utilized. “Being the managers of other people’s money than of their own, it cannot be 
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well expected, that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance.”70 Smith argued 
that corporations would not be able to compete with copartnery and proprietorships and could 
never be efficient producers, therefore not assisting society with their wealth. According to his 
writings, Smith would not support corporate control; however, he was not alive to witness 
modern day externalities such as disease which a business often pays nothing for, and the future 
of corporate personhood and corporations becoming so financially successful.  
When specifically considering the nature of CCA privately run and/or owned facilities, 
Smith would also possibly worry about security measures and human rights issues, such as the 
history of violence and prison breaks in CCA facilities.71 Firstly, Smith believed security was the 
number one concern for the state, but more importantly Smith demonstrated that the economy 
could be civilized while being profitable. CCA should be able to make a profit, while also 
benefitting society. Although Smith promoted the idea of self-interest driving individuals, he also 
regarded the social factor as “an essential or fundamental character of the individual”72 and did 
not agree with Thomas Hobbes’ self-preservation and “state of man” which would later build the 
basis for political realism. Aside from self-preservation, Smith also believed individuals wished 
to improve society and that the improvement of one’s own conditions is “secure only on the basis 
of natural human society” and “human selfishness will not prevail against the coherence of 
society.”73 Smith would possibly state that CCA should be able to reconcile their profit motive 
with their duty to better society. The next two sections elaborating on the history and 
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accountability of CCA will assist in demonstrating whether or not CCA has typically reconciled 
the two. 
  
CCA’s Bright Idea: A History of CCA 
Whether more efficient and/or morally right or wrong, the private prison industry is now 
“a thriving sector (alongside private security services) in the U.S. economy”74 and holds custody 
of Bureau of Prisons inmates and over half of the American states. Over 50% of Louisiana’s 
prison population was held in private custody in 2014, and 171,300 state and federal inmates 
were in private facilities that year (the last year reported by the Bureau of Justice Statistics in 
September 2015). The number of federal inmates held in private custody rose dramatically since 
the turn of the century (see figure below).75 Two companies account for more than 75% of the 
whole worldwide market, CCA and Wackenhut Corrections Corporation.76 
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Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Department of Justice      
  
CCA claims they invented this “bright idea” of privatizing corrections in the early 1980s 
during a conversation between former Tennessee Republican Party Chairman Thomas Beasley 
and Nashville attorney Robert Crants.77 Both were accomplished businessmen and attending a 
Republican Presidential fundraiser where they shared with the attendees their plan to solve the 
overcrowded prison problem in the United States and “make a lot of money at the same time.” 
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They decided CCA would design, build, and/or manage prisons, with revenue based on the 
number of “compensated man days” under the premise of full capacity yielding the highest 
profits. They later were recommended by a friend to contact the highest corrections director in 
Virginia, T. Don Hutto. Hutto was also the newly elected president of the American Correctional 
Association (ACA), which is widely considered to be a lobby for the private corrections industry. 
Despite this obvious conflict of interest, Hutto pushed for privatization at the ACA and benefited 
from its progress at the same time for the next several years.78 
In 1983, the three “enterprise leaders” came together with a “game changer”79 banner 
claiming they would change the way companies did business with the American government. 
Privatization was an easy sell in the United States in this time period, “just like you were selling 
cars, or real states, or hamburgers,” said Beasley. He claimed the times of big government were 
over, and venture capitalists like Jack Massey liked the sound of this. Massey was famous in the 
investment world for being the first to achieve three companies on the New York Stock 
Exchange. He owned Kentucky Fried Chicken, founded the Hospital Corporation of America 
and owned one of the largest Wendy’s franchisees. Beasley claimed he modeled CCA on the 
successful HCA, a controversial leader in the for-profit healthcare sector. This is important to 
note, as HCA cherry picking, where efficiency was created through choosing the most profitable 
parts of healthcare, or sick care according to an HCA executive, was similar to CCA’s methods 
of choosing contracts with facilities holding the most profitable types of prisoners.80 
CCA landed their first federal contract in 1983 with the U.S. Department of Justice for an 
Immigration and Naturalization Services (INS) facility in Texas. The next year they assumed the 
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management of their first prison in Shelby County, Tennessee, and opened the first private 
juvenile facility there in 1986. The company went public on the NASDAQ stock exchange that 
year, with one share of CCAX at $9. They opened the first private women’s prison in 1989 in 
Grants, New Mexico, and their first medium-security prison the next year in Winn, Louisiana. In 
the 1990s, they started acquiring competitor entities and prison service companies like TransCor, 
the U.S.’s largest long-distance transportation company, and opened their first maximum-
security facility in 1992 in Leavenworth, Kansas. CCA listed on the New York Stock Exchange 
(CXC) at $16 per share in December 1994, and changed to their current ticker, CXW, in October 
2000. Despite being public since the 1980s, their shareholders did not see a dividend until May 
2012. 81 However, since mid-2012 analysts commonly list CXW stock as a recommended hold 
and buy stock, with current market capitalization listed as $3.84B.82 
Prior to the founding of CCA, prisoner rights was forced on the agenda of T. Don Hutto 
while director of corrections in Arkansas in the 1970s. The CCA website states “Hutto 
implemented the compliance requirements of the Holt v. Sarver case…successfully bringing a 
system out of federal court supervision.” 83 However, other research shows “Hutto acted in bad 
faith for years regarding inmate suits over prison conditions.” Although Hutto issued a policy 
memo prohibiting physical abuse of inmates in 1971, the courts found his “progress” 
unsatisfactory for several years after his supposed reforms.84  
One of the most controversial facilities in CCA history was named after Hutto with 
conditions for families and children unsuitable enough they spurred litigation and a nationwide 
immigrant detainee reform policy. The T. Don Hutto Residential Facility opened in a former 
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prison under an Immigration & Customs Enforcement (ICE) contract in 2006 to detain families 
awaiting their immigration status. The American Civil Liberties Union filed suit against ICE in 
March 2007 alleging the standards at Hutto were not in compliance with the government’s 
detention standards for immigrants, with claims of substandard health care and prison-like 
conditions for children. Two years later, federal officials moved the families to a much smaller 
ICE managed family residential center in Pennsylvania and made CCA’s Hutto a female-only 
detainment center. 85  In 2009, U.S. Department of Homeland Security announced an ICE 
Detention Reform, which included initiatives “to enhance the security and efficiency of ICE’s 
nationwide detention system while prioritizing the health and safety of detainees.”86 According to 
the National Immigrant Justice Center, 2014 saw the largest increase in the detention of families 
in America since the Japanese internment during World War II, and CCA and another private 
prison company, GEO Group, continue to manage most of these beds, despite the history of 
human rights abuses.87 
 
CCA Stock & Company Health History 
 
I. From $9 to $140 Per Share…to Near Bankruptcy: October 1986-December 2000 
 
The history of Corrections Corporation of America stock dates almost to its very beginnings, 
with the company going public on the NASDAQ stock exchange as CCAX at $9 per share in 
October 1986, just three years after their founding and first federal contract in 1983. After 
acquiring competitors and opening their first maximum-security facility, they listed on the New 
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York Stock Exchange (CXC) at $16 per share in December 1994. Imprisonment rates in the 
1980s and 90s soared, and by February 13, 1998, CCA shares rose to a high of $147.37.
88
 CCA 
would never see this high again, with shares even falling below $1 in late 2000. 
 
CXW Stock Price History, Google Finance 
According to Prison Legal News writer, Dan Pens, these troubles began in July 1997 
when CCA created a real estate investment trust entity (REIT) called CCA Prison Realty Trust, 
with ticker PZN. PZN sold 18.5 million shares at $21/share in its initial public offering, raising 
$388M, which enabled Prison Realty Trust to purchase nine prisons from CCA and then lease 
then back to them. During this high, CCA announced it would merge with CCA Prison Realty 
Trust (PZN) in a $4B transaction, also now operating as a REIT, effective January 1999.89 This 
set off alarms on Wall Street with one Paine Webber analyst claiming the merger would make 
CCA a “shell of a corporation with very little capitalization behind it.” Others claimed conflicts 
of interest, as CCA founder Robert Crants was both CCA’s Chairman and PZN’s CEO. A 
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number of shareholders filed suit against CCA and PZN, alleging the merger was in favor of 
financial gain for the CCA corporate officers and not in the interests of PZN shareholders. This 
“merger” actually restructured the relationship so CCA was a subsidiary of PZN and a privately 
held company, with ownership held partly by PZN senior management. 
In May 1999, PZN announced it would increase payments to CCA for marketing and 
capacitating the new facilities owned by PZN. Analysts claimed this would be a $90M shift to 
the CCA subsidiary, at the expense of shareholders. Wall Street analyst from Davenport & Co., 
Robert Norfleet, claimed this indicated PZN management was having “credibility problems.” 
This quote sent shares plunging 35%, from $22 to $14.50 per share, and more shareholders filing 
suit. PZN made several changes attempting to appease investors, such as ousting Robert Crants 
from CCA management and announcing plans for a $100M bond issue at 12% interest; however, 
share prices continued to slip, as shareholders feared for a lack of operating capital.90 
The company hired Merrill Lynch to “help it consider strategic alternatives including a 
restructuring or merger.” On December 27, 1999, Prison Realty revealed a leverage buyout 
group proposed to bring in $350M to the company, with investors including The Blackstone 
Group, Fortress Investment Group, and Bank of America. In this plan, Prison Realty would re-
merge with CCA forming a single corporation without the REIT status. If stockholders approved 
of this deal, Credit Suisse First Boston and Lehman Brothers would supposedly give CCA a new 
$1.2B credit line. Shareholders continued to file suits, claiming this proposal would dilute their 
holdings and control of CCA.91 
On February 25, 2000, Pacific Life Insurance Co., one of PZN’s largest shareholders, 
presented a competing $200M equity investment proposal, which included debt-restructuring and 
                                                 
90
 Pens, Dan. “Prison Realty/CCA Verges on Bankruptcy.” Prison Legal News July 2000. 
https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2000/jul/15/prison-realtycca-verges-on-bankruptcy/. 
91
 Prison Legal News July 2000. 
 24 
reorganization of management. In April 2000, shareholders agreed to this proposal, (instead of 
the Blackstone plan) where they would get 1999 dividends in preferred stock and PZN would 
keep the REIT status (in the Blackstone plan where they would lose the REIT status, they would 
have paid $140M more in taxes). The day the plan was adopted, April 7
th
, 2000, PZN shares rose 
$0.94 to $3.38 a share. Dr. R. Crants resigned from PZN management, receiving $233,750 in 
severance pay and $300,000 in exchange for the shares of CCA stock he held, which was 75% of 
ownership interest in CCA, when counted with the other resigning PZN executive Michael 
Devlin. This plan also gave each executive $100,000 to buy the remaining 25% of CCA stock 
after the newly proposed PZN-CCA merger. 92  
Wall Street analysts began predicting PZN would finally show positive earnings again in 
the first quarter of 2000; however, on May 15
th
, 2000 the company declared a net loss of $27.8M 
(or $0.25 a diluted share). Revenue fell from $72M (1999, first quarter) to $17.3M, due to 
$71.2M in “uncollectable lease payments” from CCA, according to PZN. PZN stock fell on this 
day to $2.13 per share. CCA stock was also consistently tumbling during these dealings, from 
$76.70 per share on January 4
th
, 1999 to $7.71 on May 15
th
, 2000.93   
State and federal corrections authorities became concerned whether operating expenses 
would be covered and guards would be paid. By 2000, PZN and CCA together held more than 
73,000 beds under contract or development, between their operations in the United States, Puerto 
Rico, Australia, and the United Kingdom. (It is important to note here that crime rates fell 
dramatically in the 1990s, and by the 2000s these rates began flatling. Additionally, the rising 
imprisonment rates of the 1980s and 90s began to slow down by 2000. See the graph below, 
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which compares violence and homicide rates with imprisonment rates in America, between 1992 
and 2011.  
In mid-2000, less than half of 850 beds were filled in the newly built Kit Carson prison in 
Colorado. Federal and state governments were getting shaky feet and threatening to move 
prisoners from CCA beds to state-run facilities. Colorado and Wisconsin created backup plans in 
the case that CCA’s operations would fail.94 North Carolina, Georgia, Utah, and Louisiana were 
among the states that either eliminated private prisons altogether by 2001 or began scaling back 
on the future of private prisons in their state due to the financial health of the private prison 
industry and pressure from special interest groups against prison privatization. North Carolina 
converted both of their state private facilities to public and banned importing prisoners from 
other states and spec (deriving from speculative) prisons, which are facilities constructed by a 
private prison company before the signing (or even creation at times) of a state contract.95  
 
II.  From Near Bankruptcy to $30 Per Share: Post-2000 and Post-9/11 America 
Pacific Life cancelled the bailout plan for Prison Realty for failure to resolve pending law 
suits and lack of long-term credit. The company continued to ignore pending litigation and  
arranged with its bank lenders to extend their credit line, allowing Prison Realty to borrow $55M 
without outside help. They also managed to win a $760M 10-year contract with the Bureau of 
Prisons to operate two federal facilities. After reports of CCA defaulting on its debt and the 
cancelling of the Pacific Life plan, stock prices fell to under a $1.00 per share in late 2000, 
putting it at risk of being delisted from the New York Stock Exchange. Wall Street analyst 
Robert Norfleet of Davenport & Co. stated investors wanted “to see them aligned with a strong 
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financial partner” and this restructuring without Pacific Life created doubts on the future of 
CCA. Other analysts expressed outrage over the company’s treatment of its shareholders. Prison 
Realty also owed money at this time to the Blackstone Group deal makers for failing on that 
agreement as well.96 CCA and Prison Realty Trust remerged into CCA, and changed their ticker 
to CXW in October 2000.97 
CXW Stock Price, Google Finance 
 
By 2001, it appeared privatized corrections would be, at best, only a small percentage of 
the American prison system going forward considering the downturn of CCA and state 
corrections moving away from privatized facilities. However, the events of 9/11 and the arrival 
of the George W. Bush administration changed many things for CCA.  
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 CXW Stock Price, Google Finance 
 
In the first day of trading in 2001, CCA stock (now listed as CXW) opened at $1.25 per 
share; however, in the days leading up to George W. Bush taking office, CXW reached a high of 
$5 a share by January 11
th
.  On the last day of trading before 9/11, CCA stock reached $5 per 
share. In President Bush’s speech on September 11th, he stated, “The search is underway for 
those who are behind these evil acts. I've directed the full resources for our intelligence and law 
enforcement communities to find those responsible and bring them to justice.”98  
9/11 and the 2002 stock market downturn appeared to take no hit on CXW, as stock 
prices continued to rise. Between 2000 and 2009, the number of federal prisoners grew by two-
thirds, and nearly 30% of CCA’s 67,000 inmates came from federal agencies by 2009. 99 U.S. 
Bureau of Justice statistics state that total private prison populations grew by 80% from 1999 to 
2010, compared to an overall prison population growth of 18%. Although federal and state 
governments increasingly relied on privatization in this time period, the federal prison system 
numbers are more dramatic, as the number of federal prisoners held in private custody rose 
                                                 
98
 Text of Bush’s Address. CNN September 11, 2001. http://edition.cnn.com/2001/US/09/11/bush.speech.text/. 
99




 According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, “private correctional facilities (up 151) 
accounted for nearly all of the increase (total of 9% increase) in the number of adult correctional 
facilities between June 30, 2000 and December 30, 2005,” most under contract to the Federal 
Bureau of Prisons.101 
In February 2006, President Bush proposed more spending on immigration detention and 
ICE detainees,102 and CXW reached $20 by August. By May 2007, CXW was above $30 per 
share. CXW stock performed well until the 2008 financial crisis and when it appeared a 
Democrat would win the 2008 presidential election. By December 31
st
, 2008, CXW reached a 
low of $15.38 per share; however, less than a year later it reached $20 per share again in August 
2009. 
III.  Steady Times for CXW:  Post-2008 
President Obama’s flip-flop spending on immigration detention, decriminalization 
policies, and efforts to curb mandatory sentencing have taken small hits on CXW stock prices, at 
best kept them steady instead of rising in some months. Even the financial crisis aftermath and 
2010 announcement of the first drop in the American prison population since 1972 made little 
difference to CXW prices in the long-run. In May 2010 Motley Fool Stock Advisors were listing 
the stock as one of their “Three Long-Term Winners.”103 
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 CXW Stock Price, Google Finance 
 
CCA stated in their 2012 annual report they used cash flow to repurchase a total of $508M of 
their common stock between 2010 and 2012, in order to improve leverage ratios. By April 2012, 
CXW stock price reached $30 per share again, and CCA announced it would terminate its stock 
repurchase program and begin issuing cash dividends for the first time to investors in the second 




, 2013, CCA restructured into a REIT again after enactment of the federal 
REIT Modernization Act, stating the “real estate” companies no longer need a completely 
separate company to manage their non-real estate operations. While REITs must distribute at 
least 90% of their income in the form of dividends, these dividends can also be paid in stock. 105 
CCA told investors they believed this conversion could “lower cost of capital, draw a larger base 
of potential stockholders, provide flexibility to pursue growth opportunities, and create a more 
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efficient operating structure.” 106 Since 2013, CXW stock price has ranged from mid-$20s to low 
$40s per share ($40.90 on April 10
th
, 2013 and $40.32 on February 17
th
, 2015).  
 
 CXW Stock Price, Google Finance 
  
Although CXW has not reached its heydays of the late 1990s, at time of writing (spring 
2016) CXW stock prices were steadily closing each day between the mid $20s and low $30s per 
share, and Wall Street analysts were rating CXW as a recommended buy and hold stock.107 
According to the CCA 2015 annual report, they currently own or control 66 correctional and 
detention facilities and manage 11 facilities owned by states or the federal government, “with a 
total design capacity of approximately 88,500 beds in 20 states and the District of Columbia.” 
They also listed construction of three new facilities in California and Tennessee and a new 
1,000-bed contract with Arizona, with revenue reaching $1.79B in 2015. The report stated CCA 
is “the nation’s largest owner of privatized correctional and detention facilities and one of the 
largest prison operators in the United States.”108 
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CXW Stock Price, Google Finance 
 
CCA and Private Prison Irresponsibility and Accountability Measures 
This research also briefly addressed issues concerning human rights in private prison 
facilities and government and social intervention. In 2001, the Department of Justice found that 
49% more staff assaults and 65% more prisoner assaults were identified in private than public 
facilities.
109
 The last 15-20 years the private prison industry has been under scrutiny by 
governments and organizations worldwide, with Israel even ruling them unconstitutional in 
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 calling into question the sustainability of the current American private prison paradigm 
with its allegations of human rights abuses and bad business practices. Overcharging, guard 
brutality, inmate on inmate violence, inferior medical care, inadequate training, understaffing, 
and “chronic security lapses” are some of the most published scandals involving facilities under 
the watch of private prisons.
111
 
In 2003, the Corporate Research Project of Good Jobs First reported on the past 20 year 
history of CCA with a review of court records, government reports, and media, stating that CCA 
has been “buffeted by numerous lawsuits and scandals” alleging the following: 
 failure to provide adequate medical care to prisoners; 
 failure to control violence in its prisons; 
 substandard conditions that have resulted in prisoner protests and uprisings; 
 criminal activity on the part of some CCA employees, including the sale of illegal drugs 
to prisoners; and 
 escapes, which in the case of at least two facilities include inadvertent releases of 
prisoners who were supposed to remain in custody.112 
This study uncovered very similar media reports to those mentioned above. The reports 
identified for this research were filed under the following categories:  
 Labor conditions (includes alleged sexual harassment and sexual assault) 
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 Inmate conditions (includes alleged violence, insufficient medical care, substandard 
conditions, accessibility to drugs in facility) 
 Morality questions 
 Corruption 
 Security (includes escapes and kidnapping committed by inmates) 
How did these reports arise to the public, and how did these prisoner advocacy groups 
attempting to hold CCA accountable form? Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink’s 
“boomerang” effect113 provides possible answers. Advocacy networks emerge where channels are 
“blocked or hampered” between the inmates and the government, “setting into motion a 
boomerang pattern of influence.” The government is the “primary guarantor of human rights” 
and can choose to take action after the reporting of abuse in CCA facilities, but the government 
could also be a primary violator if giving contracts to a company that violates the inmates’ civil 
rights. It is the responsibility of the media and non-governmental organizations to not only report 
on the violations to the public and the government, but also to hold the government accountable 
for awarding contracts to irresponsible companies. The boomerang effect demonstrates that the 
prisoners might not report the violations to the prison, due to mismanagement and corruption, but 
will in fact often report these to an advocacy group or media outlet outside of the prison that will 
then report this to civil society and the government. This has been affective in certain ways. For 
instance, private prisons often must report deaths and human rights violation reports to a state or 
federal corrections agency when applying for a contract.114 It is assumed they will be obliged to 
report on those that are already part of the public sphere; therefore demonstrating the importance 
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of advocacy groups and media outlets in investigating and reporting on these matters. NGOs and 
media outlets provide leverage to the less powerful actors, prison inmates. 
Keck and Sikkink’s theory of accountability politics, or “the effort to hold powerful 
actors to their previously stated policies or principles,” also provides a powerful tool to advocacy 
networks and the media. Private actors like CCA, “can be held accountable to their 
pronouncements, to the law, or to contracts.”115 As mentioned in the introduction of this thesis, 
CCA makes many claims of good business practices on their website, utilizing the very 
orchestrated language and methods of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). This 
accountability for these claims can be conducted by civil society or the government. As Mary 
Kaldor writes in Global Civil Society, the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 changed the meaning of 
the term civil society, no longer confining it the borders of the territorial state.116 Although the 
United States utilizes private services and management for corrections more than any other state 
in the West, CCA has held facilities abroad and has been held accountable for actions taken in 
the States, even by investors and NGOs abroad.  
Notable is the very effective tool, divestment, where unsatisfied investors of private prison 
companies, even abroad, encourage private prison entities with human rights abuses such as 
GEO Group and CCA to comply in order to stay in the game. Netherlands-based chemical 
company DSM divested from its 73,000 pension fund shares with CCA and GEO Group in 2014, 
stating the following:  
With respect to the protection of internationally proclaimed human rights, the 
pension fund has divested from the for-profit prison industry. Investment in 
private prisons and support for the industry is financially unsound, and 
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divestment was the right thing to do for our clients, shareholders, and the 




Andrei Shleifer argued in 1998 that “many of the concerns that private firms fail to 
address social goals can be addressed through government contracting and regulation without 
resort to government ownership.” Shleifer optimistically states that the case for privatization 
only becomes stronger “when competition between suppliers, reputational mechanisms, and the 
possibility of provision by private not-for-profit firms, as well as political patronage and 
corruption, are brought into play.”118 Thus, Shleifer would argue perhaps that if investors, civil 
society, and government hold private entities responsible for human rights standards through 
competition and reputational mechanisms, this will motivate in securing the United States with a 
more humane corrections system.  
Aside from rule of law, what mechanisms are utilized by the government to old private 
prisons accountable for human rights violations and corruption? In Book V of The Wealth of 
Nations, Smith demonstrates how the state may serve the invisible hand in order to improve 
society. Government contracting agencies hold contractors accountable through Request for 
Proposal process mechanisms, oversight and monitoring (conducted by contracted private firm or 
the contracting government agency), and the granting or not granting or renewing of contracts. 
This research uncovered many incidents where CCA lost federal and state contracts due to 
irresponsible practices. For example, CCA lost four contracts in 2014 in Idaho, Mississippi, and 
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Texas due to falsified employee records, and violence and unsuitable conditions in facilities run 
by CCA. The Idaho Department of Corrections conducted a study in 2008 finding four times 
more prisoner-on-prisoner assaults at the Idaho Correctional Center (managed by CCA) than at 
all of the other seven Idaho prisons combined.119 In 2010, the ACLU sued the Idaho Correctional 
Center on behalf of inmates, stating the facility was considered a "Gladiator School" due to 
understaffing contributing to high levels of violence in the prison, and the FBI launched a 
criminal investigation into the matter in 2014.120 
This research found accountability dramatically lacking where associated with alleged 
CCA “spec” prison building,121 corruption, avoiding taxes by operating as a REIT, and lobbying 
methods (through the American Legislative Exchange Council ALEC) to change sentencing, 
laws, and regulations, as it appears government and civil society have not managed to find 
affective accountability methods concerning these matters. This brings us back to the original 
thesis of this research, can the markets assist in regulating society, or is a self-regulating 
economy impossible? The next two sections will demonstrate the theories of three main writers 
concerning this topic and whether or not investors can play a role in regulation. 
 
Self-Sustaining Markets, Consequences of Neoliberalism, & The Disembedded Economy  
The writings of Karl Polanyi can assist in explaining how privatization and private 
correction companies flourished during neoliberalism and are able to survive despite reports of 
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irresponsibility, and Adam Smith and Milton Friedman’s theories of free markets will assist in 
explaining why this research is testing whether investors can assist in re-embedding the 
economy. Neoliberalism generally means “broad support for a capitalistic, free-market economy, 
and for a reduction in the regulatory power of the state.” 122 It usually promotes free competition 
and privatization and the elimination of controlling the market with taxes and restrictions on 
investment and the flow of capital. This ideology calls on a reduction in spending on government 
spending and social services and a shift in emphasizing interdependence to individual 
responsibility (e.g. investor responsibility to regulate CCA’s behavior). This theory assumes that 
a balance will arise because of supply and demand leading to a stable equilibrium on its own, 
without the assistance of the government. Neoliberals would state this stability invokes the 
“invisible hand” of the market.123 
In 1944, Karl Polanyi linked the development of the modern state (industrialized state) 
with the creation of modern market economies in his book The Great Transformation. He wrote 
about the dialectical tension between marketization and the push for social protections fighting 
against marketization, calling this the double movement. According to his theories, initially 
laissez-faire reformers attempt to disembed the economy establishing a “market society,” (or 
self-regulating market) where all things are can become a commodity. Marketization can also 
include a restructuring of the legal environment in which the market actor exists, such as CCA 
lobbying for different justice reforms that benefit their business. Polanyi argued a reactionary 
“countermovement” (government regulations) rises up with hopes to re-embed the economy with 
social protections, through protective regulation on land, labor, and capital. Polanyi would most 
likely state CCA is able to act irresponsibly due to the disembedded economy and the 
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consequences of the impossible neoliberal utopian notion of free markets. The liberal reformers 
find the market to be self-regulating without the needs for society’s intervention; however, 
Polanyi wrote this was not possible, as economies are always embedded in societies.124 
As mentioned earlier, Adam Smith built the basis for what would later become arguments 
for free markets. In several of his writings, he speaks of the “invisible hand”125 where society 
benefits from the works of individual actions of self-interest more than the actions of those 
interested in helping society. Polanyi often mentions Adam Smith in The Great Transformation, 
stating that “Smith suggested the division of labor in society was dependent upon the existence 
of markets; or as he puts it ‘upon man’s propensity to barter, truck and exchange one thing for 
another.”126 Polanyi states that Smith built the concept of the Economic Man, and “that no 
misreading of the past ever proved more prophetic of the future.” 127  With the birth of 
industrialism comes theorist after theorist equating the principle of the division of labor with 
barter and exchange. He lists Herbert Spencer, Ludwig von Mises, and Walter Lippman as a few 
of these economists.128 Smith believed man to have a propensity to barter and depend on the 
markets and at the same time to be moral, and those managing the market to be of moral 
character, therefore giving the impression the powers of the market will make decisions that will 
better mankind. This gives way for arguments concerning whether or not these markets can exist 
without government regulation. 
Following in the footsteps of Smith is Milton Friedman who believed government’s job 
was to “foster competitive markets.” 129 In 1962, he wrote in his seminal work, Capitalism and 
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Freedom, that “government can never duplicate the variety and diversity of an individual 
action.” 130  Therefore, Friedman might state private prison investor actions can replace 
government intervention. A large supporter of free markets, he would often note in his writings 
and talks that he did not know of a society that experienced a large amount of freedom and did 
not utilize something comparable to a free market to organize their economic activity. He 
believed arguments against free markets were due to “a lack of believe in freedom itself.”131 He 
was not advocating for the elimination of government, but rather government choosing to invest 
intelligently instead of overinvesting and subsidization. 132  It should be noted that Friedman 
though was also an advocate for government enforcing private contracts.133 Most importantly 
though, this research emphasizes Friedman’s beliefs concerning the degree of social 
responsibility of business: 
The view has been gaining widespread acceptance that corporate officials and 
labor leaders have a "social responsibility" that goes beyond serving the 
interest of their stockholders or their members. This view shows a 
fundamental misconception of the character and nature of a free economy. In 
such an economy, there is one and only one social responsibility of business 
to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so 
long as it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open 
and free competition, without deception or fraud.
134
 
 This research calls into question whether free market mechanisms encourage investors to 
assist in holding companies socially responsible or whether Polanyi’s double movement must 
exist where government steps in to regulate, and/or re-embed the economy with social 
protections. Do investors assist civil society and government on re-embedding and holding CCA 
accountable, or do they assist CCA in deregulating by providing capital for CCA operations and 
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not responding to reports of CCA irresponsibility. In the introduction of this study, I mentioned 
that many stockholders brought litigation against CCA at the turn of the century when they felt 
they were not treated well as a shareholder, a blatant example of the stockholder re-embedding 
social protections after CCA practices that encourage deregulation (investors trying to organize 
the market with regulations as opposed to a self-regulating market). Can they also be Smith and 
Friedman’s innovative individual actors that assist in sustaining free markets? 
 
Could Investors Assist in Holding CCA Accountable for Irresponsibility? 
After discovering the lack of scholarship examining the behavior of investors of the 
private prison industry, this study attempts to shed light on whether these investors respond to 
reports of social irresponsibility of CCA. This research found it important to consider different 
factors that play into investor decisions and stock prices, for example, investor concerns over the 
lack of future growth and/or superficial growth. Also, investors can buy or sell when they think a 
company’s bad behavior is hurting profits, and/or when they morally believe a company is 
misbehaving. Perhaps they even see morals and profits as being related. 
As stated earlier, investors can be an effective tool for holding CCA accountable, e.g. 
divestment campaigns. Investor intentions aside, risks to revenue and reputation arising from 
human rights violations and ensuing lawsuits “pose a significant risk to investors.” Several 
private prison operators “appear to have placed short-term gain ahead of longer-term 
sustainability by staffing fewer employees, offering lower pay and providing fewer hours of 
training,” according to Zachary Paris’s 2012 article in Sustainalytics Reporter.135 If investors 
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witness a pattern of CCA losing government contracts after reports of irresponsibility, then they 
will possibly base their decisions on these patterns. 
According to the already recognized 2001 BOJ study, large fluctuations in stock prices 
can be equated to “dissolution” involving “concern over the lack of future growth” and times 
when few announcements are made concerning major new contracts. This study found that most 
of the “added capacity” mentioned by private companies like CCA “occurred when larger firms 
merged with smaller firms.” For example, CCA purchased U.S. Corrections Corporation and 
facilities and contracts managed by the Bobby Ross Group prior to this study. “These 
transactions suggest a consolidation of private-sector firms and, more significantly, little growth 
in overall bed capacity as the public sector becomes more wary about the benefits of 
privatization.”136 As mentioned in the History of CCA section, CCA has a history of investors 
filing suit due to superficial growth or non-transparent practices between board members and the 
company. 
Although this research did not particularly consider investor intentions, it is impossible to 
ignore here Adam Smith’s argument concerning self-interest. As mentioned earlier, Smith 
believed that good works from individual actions of self-interest were more effective than the 
actions of those interested in helping society: 
…he intends only his own security; and by directing that industry in such a 
manner as its produce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his own 
gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to 
promote an end which was no part of his intention. Nor is it always the worse 
for the society that it was not part of it. By pursuing his own interest he 
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frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really 
intends to promote it. I have never known much good done by those who 
affected to trade for the public good.
137
 
Smith would possibly state that investor actions concerned with losing money who sell 
shares after the reporting of social irresponsibility are possibly more effective than those 
divesting over moral concerns. Perhaps Smith would state investor actions of buying and selling 
shares are more effective than the work of NGOs and government. 
What would Polanyi suspect investor behavior to be? In The Great Transformation, 
Polanyi names investors as the “haute finance” that assisted Europe in maintaining 100 years of 
peace, but also states “business and finance were responsible for many colonial wars.” 138 With 
respect to the double movement, he would state government actors desire regulation and the 
capitalists or free market actors push for deregulation. Polanyi considers investors part of the 
ones preserving the liberal, free market institutions, or the capitalists. Polanyi would state the 
investors are motivated by actions that assist in deregulating the market and disembedding the 
economy. Therefore, he would predict that the private prison investors will act in a way that 
encourages a free market without regulations, in order to maintain profits. The European 
investors of the 1800s were perhaps not motivated in keeping peace for moral reasons, but rather 
with the goal of maintaining power and profits. The private prison investors will react to reports 
of CCA irresponsibility if this affects profit or the free flow of the market. Polanyi suggests that 
investors are commoditizing land, labor, and capital in order to maintain the free markets and 
will respond only when the market and/or profit is threatened.  
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One might question whether CCA investors are part of the real market, as the company 
thrives partially off of government contracts and taxpayer money. Former CEO of Sotero 
Defense Solutions, John Hillen, explored whether the “GovCon market” is part of the “real 
market” in a speech he gave at George Mason University in 2014. He argued that like the real 
market, the GovCon market today has a diverse assortment of buyers and sellers and “multiple 
planes and dimensions of competition and choice.” Some of this was driven by recent wars, he 
states, but nonetheless, the GovCon market is constantly growing and offering value with more 
and more transparency each year. Since 9/11, the number of GovCon companies that go public is 
quickly increasing, according to Hillen. 139  Aside from Hillen’s argument, CCA has been 
publically traded and funded partially by investors since 1986 and is currently a publically traded 
real estate company, owning or controlling 74 properties.140 Aside from being a major player in 
the ever-growing GovCon market, is it not already a large player in the real estate and stock 
market? 
After this review of how investors are able to make a difference in the degree of socially 
embeddedness of the economy, would not this imply private prison investors would react to 
reports of CCA irresponsibility, perhaps in order to maintain profits?  
 
This research will consider the following hypothesis: 
H1: This thesis predicts that as the number of reports of CCA irresponsibility in a particular 
month in the 2000-2010 interval increases, CXW stock prices in the same month decrease.  
Therefore, this research predicts that the dependent variable, CXW Stock Price Per Share 
Monthly (DV broken down into three DVs: high, low, and average), has a significant and 
                                                 
139
 Hillen, John. “Is the GovCon market a ‘real market?’. Washington Technology. June 4, 2014. 
https://washingtontechnology.com/Articles/2014/06/04/Insights-Hillen-mature-market-part-3.aspx. 
140
 CCA Website Investor Information Section. http://www.cca.com/investors/investor-information. 
 44 
negative relationship with independent variables Media Report CCA Count Monthly (IVs made 
from the following report categories of irresponsibility: labor, inmate, corruption, morality, and 
security). This research predicts that each independent variable can be used to predict the same 
month’s CXW Stock Price Per Share Monthly. Comparison is made in the same month, as buyers 
and sellers of stock will take action immediately upon reading or hearing of the report that will 
affect the value of the CCA shares. I experimented using a lag month (see below); however, 
results were very similar nonetheless, and it is much less likely the media reports would affect 
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Sig. (2-tailed)  .000 .000 
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Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000  
N 132 132 132 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
This research predicts that reports of CCA irresponsibility are correlated with changes in 
the price of CXW stock shares, and investors view CCA irresponsibility as ‘bad for business’ 
and will sell or choose to not invest after the reportings. As Polanyi suggests, are investors 
commoditizing land, labor, and capital, or are they utilizing their self-interests by responding to 
these reports and assisting in re-embedding the economy with social protections, making the 




As stated earlier, this research concerns media reports regarding alleged CCA 
irresponsibility in comparison to the stock price of CCA the month of reporting and after. This 
chapter will discuss the research methods used in the study, research design, data collection, 
instruments used, validation and reliability of the data, and initial analysis of the raw data. Final 
analysis of the organized and tested data will be conducted in Chapter Six. 
 
Data Collection and Methods 
This quantitative study involved statistical analysis and open source research using only 
credible and reliable publicly available data provided by Google Finance, and media hits from 
Google News, ACLU, and Prison Legal News search engines. Initial searches identified a variety 
and diverse group of reports when utilizing these three sources. Specifically, CCA stock (CXW) 
price monthly highs and lows were taken from Google Finance; an average of these highs and 
lows were calculated to find an average monthly stock price; and media reports of CCA 
irresponsibility were identified through an advanced Google News search, ACLU report search, 
and a Prison Legal News search. This research considers data from 2000 to 2010, due to the 
dramatic changes in CXW stock prices and the significant increase in the federal prison 
population under the watch of private facilities in this time period. This research questioned 
whether reports of CCA irresponsibility were related to these dramatic changes in price. Future 
research would ideally include older and newer data as well, in order to view the entire spectrum 
of CCA’s over-30 year history. 
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Initial searches identified several major categories arising from reported CCA 
irresponsibility. Through methods of grounded theory
141
, where inductive coding constructed the 
structure of the analysis, the following categories emerged:  labor, inmate, corruption, morality, 
and security. This initial process involved Google and Google News searches with keywords 
such as “CCA” and/or “CCA” AND “abuse” for several weeks using different browsers and 
different IP addresses, logged in and out of Google accounts, in an effort to explore all possible 
Google hits and all major categories of abuse. 
 
DV and IVs – Definitions and Measure 
This research employed the U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics definition for private 
prisons:  “prison facilities run by private prison corporations whose services and beds are 
contracted out by state governments or the Federal Bureau of Prisons.”142 These contractual 
agreements typically involve governments committing prisoners and then paying a per diem or 
monthly rate for each inmate in that particular facility. 
Privatization in this research is considered as the transfer of ownership of business, 
services, or property from the public sector to the private sector, or the government contracting 
out, or outsourcing services to a private entity. 
The privatization of prisons is defined as “the takeover of existing public facilities by 
private prison operators and the building and operation of new facilities created by prison-for-
profit companies,” as defined by Amy Cheung of Washington, D.C. based The Sentencing 
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 I considered the operations of the largest of these prison-for-profit companies, 
Corrections Corporation of America (CCA). CCA headed the first takeover of an entire facility 
in the United States in 1984, and by December 2000, 153 private correctional facilities (prisons, 
jails, and detention centers) were operating with capacities over 119,000.
144
 As noted earlier, 
U.S. Bureau of Justice Statistics state that total private prison populations grew by 80% from 
1999 to 2010, compared to an overall prison population growth of 18%.145 Although federal and 
state governments increasingly relied on privatization in this time period, the federal prison 
system numbers are more dramatic, as the number of federal prisoners held in private custody 
rose 784%, according to the Sentencing Project.146 
For usage of the dependent variable CXW Stock Price Per Share Monthly, this study 
considered the Nasdaq Stock Market Terms Glossary, as the New York Stock Exchange does not 
appear to have an online glossary. Stock is defined as the “ownership of a corporation indicated 
by shares, which represent a piece of the corporation’s assets and earnings.” 147 The stock price 
high in a month is assumed to be the highest amount an investor was willing to pay for a share 
that month, and the stock price low is perceived as the lowest amount an investor was willing to 
pay for a share that month. Variables also included an average of the two, in order to test all 
possible variations of the price in a month. These stock prices are measured in the same fashion 
as stock prices on the NYSE, U.S. dollars.  
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The independent variable Media Report CCA Count Monthly is defined as the number of 
reports identified involving CCA irresponsibility in a given month. This variable was created 
with the following categories of irresponsibility: labor, inmate, corruption, morality, and 
security. I counted by report and not event and attempted to consistently exclude repetitive 
events; however, there were cases where one media finding, for instance, might mention a past 
event but with a new alleged notion of irresponsibility not included in the previously counted 
article of the same event. I decided it most appropriate to count by report and not event, as the 
variable to most likely affect the investor would be a report of CCA irresponsibility, not the 
particular events. It was noted that prison events are most likely not always reported in the 
media, as many of them are high security facilities and some with limited amounts of public 
access. Therefore, it is assumed that if an event in CCA facility goes unreported, it would likely 
not affect investor behavior. In order to legitimate this research, the design of the study was 
influenced by a review of prior academic research on the effects of media-provided information 
on investor behavior.  
In order to completely evaluate stock prices, I chose to utilize control variables and took 
into account CXW Price to Earnings Ratio and the Trade Weighted Dollar U.S. Index Broad 
Monthly Average at the time of each particular stock price measure, as stock price is only a part 
of the evaluation of the health of a company and other national and global elements influence 
whether or not shares will be bought or sold. As you can see below, stock price is often erratic; 
however, indicators such as market capitalization, enterprise value, price to earnings ratio, and 
revenue are more concrete examples of an evaluation of the health of a company and influence 
whether a stock would be purchased.  
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Courtesy of Gurufocus 
 
Most identified academic research used complex formulas or different measurements 
regarding stock dividends (such as dividend to price ratio) to predict stock prices and returns148; 
however, CXW did not begin issuing dividends to their investors until May 2012. This research 
only considered data for 2000 to 2010. It should also be noted the many studies identified 
demonstrating the presence of irrational or uninformed investors in the stock market, making 
decisions based on their own sentiments and expectations and not rational computation.149  
Price to Earnings Ratio is defined by the Nasdaq Glossary as displaying “the multiple 
earnings at a which a stock sells.” It is “a widely used stock evaluation measure” that is 
                                                 
148
 Hodrick, Robert J. “Dividend Yields and Expected Stock Returns.” The Review of Financial Studies Volume 5. 
Issue 3. 357-386. 1992.  
149
 Schleifer, Andrei and Lawrence H. Summers. “The Noise Trader Approach to Finance.” Journal of Economic 
Perspectives Volume 4. Number 2. 19-33. Spring 1990. 
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”determined by dividing current stock price by current earnings per share (adjusted for stock 
splits).” Earnings per share for the price to earnings ratio are computed by “dividing earnings for 
the past 12 months by the number of common shares outstanding.” Higher multiple demonstrates 
that investors have bid up the stock’s price due to higher expectations.150 It is measured as a ratio 
in TTM figures, or Trailing Twelve Months figures, meaning a representation of its financial 
performance for the past 12 months. 
The Trade Weighted Dollar U.S. Index Broad Monthly Average is defined by the Federal 
Reserve as “a weighted average of the foreign exchange value of the U.S. dollar against the 
currencies of a broad group of major U.S. trading partners.” It is measured in units of 100 U.S. 





Methods and Descriptions of Raw Data 
 The data for dependent variable CXW Stock Price Per Share Monthly was collected 
through Google Finance, CXW Price to Earnings Ratio from Guru Focus, and the Trade 
Weighted Dollar U.S. Index Broad Monthly Average data from The Federal Research Bank of St. 
Louis. All sources allowed downloading of data into Excel spreadsheets. The average monthly 
stock price variable was calculated by averaging the high and the low variables. The price to 
earnings ratios were converted from quarterly to monthly by assigning each month in that quarter 
the data point listed for the specific quarter. Quarterly P/E ratios were reported in the months of 
March, June, September, and December. Note that CXW showed 0 for all quarterly P/E ratios in 
2000-2002. In June 2003, the CXW P/E ratio listed above zero for the first time in the decade at 
9.69. 
                                                 
150
 Nasdaq Glossary of Stock Market Terms. http://www.nasdaq.com/investing/glossary/. 
151
 Definition taken from downloaded U.S. Federal Reserve spreadsheet. 
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When collecting data for the independent variable Media Report CCA Count Monthly, 
Google News settings were adjusted to include all hits and not just the hits Google found 
appropriate for the personal browser history. This search was conducted with the phrase 
“Corrections Corporation of America” and was filtered by date, January 1st, 2000 to December 
31
st
, 2010. Each hit was analyzed for an alleged act of CCA irresponsibility. When a report was 
found, each was counted and filed under one of the five categories:  labor, inmate, corruption, 
morality, or security. The Google News search identified 125 total reports of CCA 
irresponsibility.  
ACLU and Prison Legal News searches were included in this study, as both were found 
to highly influence the largest media outlet reports. Additionally, Google News did not identify 
many hits with “Corrections Corporation of America,” despite a Google search with the same 
phrase yielding many hits that included several media outlets quoting or using Prison Legal 
News and ACLU reports. Lastly, it is important to note the notoriety of Prison Legal News in the 
prison investing world, as Forbes called it “the most comprehensive publication worldwide 
devoted to prison trends.” 152  In the month that Prison Legal News managing editor Alex 
Friedmann gave a speech on CCA irresponsibility at a CXW shareholder meeting (May 2008), 
this study counted the third highest number of media reports for this research, demonstrating the 
influence Friedmann and Prison Legal News have on media reporting. 
When searches were conducted of ACLU and Prison Legal News website search engines 
with the same search phrase and date perimeters, 118 reports of CCA irresponsibility were 
counted in this part of the study, totaling 243 reports for all search engines, including Google 
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News. As noted earlier, attempts were made to not count reports that considered repetitive 
events. 
This research found the following count: 
Labor Condition Reports 13 
Inmate Condition Reports 176 
Morality Reports 11 
Corruption Reports 32 
Security Reports 11 
Total Reports 243 
 
As demonstrated above, inmate conditions were a great majority of the reports. 
 
The following months yielded the highest amount of reports (5 or more), with May 2007 
and November 2010 with the highest count of 9: 
February 2007 5 
May 2007 9 
April 2008 5 
May 2008 7 
November 2008 5 
March 2009 5 
April 2009 5 
July 2009 5 
August 2009 6 
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January 2010 6 
May 2010 5 
August 2010 6 
November 2010 9 
December 2010 5 
 
As demonstrated above, the highest count of reports falls in the second half of the 
researched time period. It is important to recognize here when investors began Googling and 
paying attention to daily news events on the Internet versus physical newspapers and magazines. 
According to WHOIS data, the domain name for Google was registered on September 15, 1997, 
and Google became a public company in 2004. I continued to find 2000-2006 relevant as well 
considering the sample populated, just not as many as the end of the 2000s. Additionally, this 
time period was found important considering the dramatic changes at CCA and in CXW stock 
prices in that time period. It was also considered that investors were still reading newspapers and 
magazines even if they were not Googling. Most importantly this research would like to 
emphasize the importance of using Google News as a tool for analysis. Google News hits include 
major and local news sources, such as The New York Times and local newspapers, and the tool 
was identified as a reliable tool for analysis of media data in many bodies of recent empirical 
research and scholarship.153 
The statistical analysis then utilized multivariate time series analysis, using OLS 
regression, to empirically test the hypothesis. This involved a Pearson’s Correlation Matrix to 
show the relationship between the independent variables and the dependent variable (DV CXW 
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 See Carneiro (2009), Krstajic (2010), Flaounas (2011), Berendt (2009), Skadina (2012). 
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Stock Price Per Share Monthly broken down into three DVs: high, low, and average), and 
whether they are significant. By displaying how well these correlate with each other, this 
analysis can evaluate the level of statistical significance attained by a possible multivariate 
relationship.  
 Concerning the sample size in this time series analysis study, all variables are monthly 
for the time period 2000-2010, making the N=132 (11 years x 12 months = 132). 
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Findings 
The following statistical analysis was conducted of the independent variables and 
dependent variable with respect to the hypothesis mentioned above. 
Before utilizing a multivariate time series analysis by using OLS regression to 
empirically test the hypothesis, I began by describing the relationship of the independent variable 
to the different variations of the dependent variable with bivariate scatter plots and a Pearson’s 
Correlation Matrix (see below) in order to identify the most appropriate variation of the 
dependent variable for testing. It appears that when the dependent variable, CXW Stock Price Per 
Share Monthly, is analyzed with respect to its variation in a month, all three variations (low, 
average, and high) have a similar relationship and were all found to be highly significant to the 
independent variable, Media Report CCA Total Count Monthly (the total of all identified reports 
in a month). They also all three yielded similar (moderate) correlations to the independent 
variable. Therefore going forward in this research, CXW Stock Price Average Per Share Monthly 
was utilized as the only dependent variable, as it also is an average of the prices that month 








This study then conducted an F Test to indicate the significance of the model as a whole, 







Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 2183.386 5 436.677 8.327 .000
b
 
Residual 6607.401 126 52.440   
Total 8790.787 131    
a. Dependent Variable: CXW Stock Average Per Share Monthly 
b. Predictors: (Constant), Media Report CCA Inmate Count Monthly, Media Report 
CCA Security Issue Count Monthly, Media Report CCA Morality Count Monthly, 
Media Report CCA Labor Count Monthly, Media Report CCA Corruption Count 
Monthly 
 
The F Test above indicates that the model as a whole, is significant, at the p<.01 level, 




Model R R Square 
Adjusted R 
Square 




 .248 .219 7.24153 
a. Predictors: (Constant), Media Report CCA Inmate Count 
Monthly, Media Report CCA Security Issue Count 
Monthly, Media Report CCA Morality Count Monthly, 
Media Report CCA Labor Count Monthly, Media Report 
CCA Corruption Count Monthly 
 
 
The Adjusted R Square above explains 21.9% of the variation in the model, when the 
predictors are held constant. The independent variables can be used to predict 21.9% of variance 
in the dependent variable, CXW Stock Average Per Share Monthly. Since I have already 
identified statistical significance between variables, I can still find this model valuable and later 
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draw conclusions concerning how changes in the predictor values are related to the changes in 
the response value if needed. In order to test the relationships of the significant independent 










t Sig. B Std. Error Beta 













5.884 2.166 .218 2.717 .008 
Media Report 
CCA Labor Count 
Monthly 




1.873 .445 .336 4.205 .000 
a. Dependent Variable: CXW Stock Average Per Share Monthly 
 
 
 The model above indicates that the positive relationship between the independent 
variables, Media Report Corruption Count Monthly, and the dependent variable, CXW Stock 
Average Per Share Monthly, is significant. For every one unit increase in Media Report 
Corruption Count Monthly, the CXW Stock Average Per Share Monthly will increase by 2.821. 
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The model above indicates that the positive relationship between the independent variables, 
Media Report Security Issue Count Monthly, and the dependent variable, CXW Stock Average 
Per Share Monthly, is significant. For every one unit increase in Media Report Security Issue 
Count Monthly, the CXW Stock Average Per Share Monthly will increase by 5.884. The model 
above indicates that the positive relationship between the independent variables, Media Report 
Inmate Count Monthly, and the dependent variable, CXW Stock Average Per Share Monthly, is 
significant. For every one unit increase in Media Report Inmate Count Monthly, the CXW Stock 
Average Per Share Monthly will increase by 1.873. 
This study’s hypothesis concerning the negative and significant relationships between the 
independent variables and the dependent variable, CXW Stock Price Per Share Monthly, is not 
empirically supported with this research. However, the findings stating that a rise in the number 
of reports of CCA irresponsibility concerning security issues, corruption, and inmate having a 
significant relationship to a rise in CCA stock price is of great interest and should be tested 
further in future research. Why would the stock price rise after a report of abuse? Additionally, 
this study found most interesting the lack of influence these reports of CCA irresponsibility had 
on investors selling or refusing to buy shares after a report of abuse, thus demonstrating the need 






Discussion and Future Research 
I. Discussion of Quantitative Findings 
This exploratory quantitative research demonstrates support for disproving the notion of 
free markets and the ability of markets to self-correct. If CXW investors appear to disregard 
reports of CCA irresponsibility (whether or not they find them relevant with respect to morality 
or past actions by government and other investors), then the findings exhibit a need for 
government regulation in order to regulate CCA behavior. If CXW investors are not influenced 
by reports of CCA irresponsibility with respect to selling or refusing to purchase CXW shares, 
then possibly as Polanyi’s notion of the double movement indicates, government will step in to 
provide social protections through the enforcement of regulations. 
The study considered that CXW investors are not exposed often to reports of CCA 
irresponsibility; however, many of the media reports were published by major media outlets such 
as The New York Times and the Washington Post, making this conclusion less believable. 
Therefore, this consideration was not included as a possible finding for this research. It is 
assumed that the investors did not find the reports to be relevant to their personal belief system 
or their self-interest in sustaining or improving the health of CXW stock. 
These findings suggest the validation of the theories of Adam Smith and Milton 
Friedman concerning markets and self-interest, and the possible lack of investor accountability 
of CCA for their reported irresponsible behavior, which insinuates the importance of Polanyi’s 
double movement. These findings suggest investors commoditize land, labor, and capital, 
supporting the theories of Polanyi’s double movement, which also state that markets disembed 
society of social protections. This research indicates the need for government intervention with 
market regulations, if the desire is to protect land, labor, and capital. Most importantly this 
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research identified the great importance of the presence of Polanyi’s double movement, with 
respect to the need for government regulations to hold CCA accountable for acts of abuse, 
corruption, and irresponsibility. This gives space to Polanyi’s argument concerning the need for 
government regulations, and the notion that free markets and neoliberalism are utopian ideals.  
This study found these findings to be supportive of Polanyi’s notion of the double 
movement; regardless of investor and corporate intentions, the relationship between the markets 
and society is dialectical and significant. For instance, if CCA pays out a large settlement to the 
IRS over “questionable” tax deductions taken by the trust, 1 this settlement could anger investors 
when they read the annual report, provoking them to protest such irresponsibility at the next 
shareholder meeting. The actions of the market assist in deregulating society when a corporation 
does not pay due taxes for example, and government can step in to hold the company 
accountable for their actions and/or civil society (including investors) can hold the company 
accountable with respect to their own self-interests or those of the polis. 
 
II. Limitations 
Various elements fell outside the scope of this research when considering triangulating 
the research and demonstrating causality; however, future research is willing to exchange 
variables and methods in order to make further attempts to demonstrate causality. The most 
concern lies in the evaluation of CCA company value. I should possibly replace the variable 
Price to Earnings Ratio in future research with other financial indicators giving full value of the 
company CCA. Additionally, attempts should be made to identify more complex ways of 
analyzing media data. Further research is also necessary considering the fine details involved 
                                                 
1
 Meador, Jonathan. “CCA Announces Possible Restructuring Strategy.” Nashville Scene May 3, 2012. 
http://www.nashvillescene.com/pitw/archives/2012/05/03/cca-announces-possible-restructuring-strategy. 
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with possible double movement variables affecting CCA behavior. Lastly, older and more 
current data is desired for this dataset for testing, as interesting would be a quantitative 
evaluation of the full life of CCA, from 1984 to present, and what actors and practices hold them 
accountable for social responsibility. 
 
III. Future Research  
As stated earlier, future research concerning media reports of CCA irresponsibility and 
effects on investor behavior should attempt to analyze the full life of CCA. However, most 
importantly, testing should be conducted of 2005 to present, and with only media findings from 
media outlets used daily by investors of private prison stock. By beginning in 2005, I can be 
further ensured that time period issues concerning amount of Internet usage of those times and 
instrument changes of how investors receive their news will not be as relevant, as the study 
would be contained in more modern times. Also, with respect to media outlets thought to be used 
often by investors in the private prison industry, one should consider conservative media outlets 
such as Fox News, which caters to Republican voters, and supporters of harsh drug sentencing, 
and tough on crime legislation, which all financially benefit the private prison industry. A search 
in Google News for “Corrections Corporation of America” and “Fox News” brings up 252 hits; 
however, even initial research of these hits identified many reports of CCA irresponsibility. 
Due to the results of the control variables as being highly correlated to the dependent 
variable, a future study should include comparisons of the effects of other global or national 
financial indicators (e.g. the Dow Jones Industrial Average, Nasdaq Composite, and the S&P 500 
Index) on stock price. Interesting would be a comparative study of the difference in the social 
and financial indicators’ influences on CXW stock price. However, even these elements are 
 67 
affected by societal events. Although several of the events below involve economic actors, all 
also involve defining non-economic factors.  
Future research should consider the percentage of shares owned by individuals versus 
companies. According to research conducted in 2007 by Michael Welch and Fatiniyah Turner at 
Rutgers University, CCA was mostly owned by corporate entities. CCA had “114 institutional 
stockholders that together amounted to 28,736,071 shares of stock.”2  
It is possible that litigation costs could also be a variable with a strong relationship to 
stock prices and others. Perhaps investors are aware of high litigation costs in some years, as 
they are presented in each annual report and can be quantified. Further research of company 
reports and company documents would also be interesting with respect to Keck & Sikkink’s 
notion of accountability politics, where “powerful actors are held to their previously stated 
policies or principles.”3 Which of the many claims listed on the CCA website does the entity 
actually hold to? 
With consideration to accountability and future research involving CCA’s role in the 
double movement, my past studies concerning CCA lobbying and CCA government contract 
effects on CXW stock prices should be included, as lobbying is the most concrete example of 
CCA disembedding of the markets. As mentioned earlier, CCA spent significant more money on 
lobbying in 2007 and 2009 (see below), and government contracts post 2009 greatly increased as 
well. Exploration of why and how these actors affect each other and its relationship to CXW 
stock prices/company value of the years after would be of most interest, with hopes of finding 
causal relationships within the double movement between CCA and society.  
                                                 
2
 Welch, Michael and Fatiniyah Turner. “Private Corrections, Financial Infrastructure, and Transportation: The New 
Geo-Economy of Shipping Prisoners.” Social Justice Vol. 34. No. ¾: 56-77. 2007-2008. 
3
 Keck, Margaret and Kathryn Sikkink. Activists Beyond Borders. Cornell University Press, 1998. 
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Conclusion 
This research does not support Adam Smith and Milton Friedman’s notions of the 
importance of individual actions and the ability of the markets to self-correct. According to 
Polanyi, the economy is disembedded, allowing CCA to: win government contracts despite a 
history of irresponsibility; avoid taxes through the methods of a REIT entity; and lobby and set 
contract standards which do not assist in reducing recidivism but rather fill prison beds. The 
findings of this research support the existence of Polanyi’s double movement and demonstrate 
the need for harsher regulations concerning contracting of private prisons, lobbying, and usage of 
the REIT label, as it appears investors are not selling or refusing to buy shares after allegations of 
irresponsibility. Therefore, this analysis and future ones will contend the importance of 
government and civil society in holding CCA responsible for acts of abuse. 
CXW stock is currently performing well, according to stock market analysts, and CCA 
has issued dividends to investors since 2012. According to the rules of Polanyi’s substantivism, 
stating economy and exchange are linked to human behavior, in order for a private penal entity 
to continue flourishing in the markets, they must ensure the trust of their investors and civil 
society. Therefore, CCA will continue to re-embed (or appear to re-embed) protections with 
educational and rehabilitation programs,4 while continuing to disembed the economy with human 
rights abuses and corruption. With respect to this lackadaisical behavior and the findings of this 
research, it appears to be the role of government and civil society to hold CCA accountable for 
such actions. As this research found, investors do not appear to respond to reports of 
irresponsibility, and civil society and government are constantly stepping in to subordinate the 
markets to societal needs, validating Polanyi’s theory of the presence of the double movement. 
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 According to Foucaldian discourse, any reform or action CCA takes should be considered taken for more 
organizational reasons that humanitarian ones. 
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Disregarding the intentions and self-interest of investors, civil society, and CCA, society is 
deeply embedded in the markets, and actions taken by all actors affect each other in the double 
movement. 
However, by further exploring the relationship of the double movement to self-interest, 
one can perhaps find additional answers to the questions asked in this research. Does self-interest 
and the markets work towards what’s best for society as Smith suggests or has man been 
conditioned to believe so and government regulations are necessary to sustain the markets, as 
Polanyi would suggest? This thesis and its findings strongly support the notions of Karl Polanyi 
and the double movement. Since the birth of industrialization, man has been conditioned to 
believe he relies on the market, yet in actuality the markets rely on humankind for survival. 
Above all, this research has demonstrated that the private prison market is not self-
regulating (as Smith and Friedman suggest). As Polanyi states, man has never seen a market that 
is in fact self-regulating, and the notion itself is fictional. Each man’s actions, if motivated by 
self-interest or not, will not always be what’s best for all. It appears the double movement is 
ever-present and regulation is crucial in holding the private prison industry accountable and 
subordinate to society. This research supports Polanyi’s ideas concerning the inabilities of self-
interest and the markets to direct humanity: 
To allow the market mechanism to the sole director of the fate of human 
beings and their natural environment, indeed, even of the amount and use of 
purchasing power, would result in the demolition of society. For the alleged 
commodity “labor power” cannot be shoved about, used indiscriminately, or 
even left unused, without affecting also the human individual who happens to 
be the bearer of this peculiar commodity.5 
                                                 
5
 Polanyi, Karl. 1944. 76. 
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Afterword 
I wrote this thesis before a pertinent Department of Justice announcement on August 18, 
2016. In this announcement the DOJ stated they would begin to phase out of giving government 
contracts to private prison companies, “a first step in the process of reducing-and ultimately 
ending” the federal government’s “use of privately operated prisons.” The DOJ “sent a memo to 
the Acting Director of the Bureau of Prisons directing that, as each private prison contract 
reaches an end of its term, the bureau should either decline to renew that contract or substantially 
reduce its scope in a manner consistent with law and the overall decline of the bureau’s inmate 
population.” According to the DOJ memo, privately run prison conditions compare poorly to the 
federally run facilities. 6  
After news from the DOJ, CXW stock immediately plummeted to less than $18 per share. 
As of this writing on August 24, 2016, shares are less than $18 per share, 7 and CXW is now 
considered a “junk stock.” As CCA hides behind their corporate/real estate company status while 
partaking in public and private benefits and acting irresponsibly, the entity (and private prisons) 
will eventually be considered unsustainable, as predicted in my 2015 research.8 And it appears 
that, as Polanyi predicted, the double movement will always exist to hold the market 
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This study also recognizes the investor exception, when considering civil society activists like 
Alex Friedmann, who is a CCA shareholder and who’s work with Prison Legal News was used often in 
this research. He is a former CCA prisoner turned activist since he left the system after 10 years of 
imprisonment. Six of those years were spent in a CCA facility. Friedmann is a national expert on prison 
privatization, the associate director of the Human Rights Defense Center, and president of the non-profit 
Private Corrections Institute. In addition to testifying before Congress and the Legislature on criminal 
justice-related issues,
9
 Friedmann purchased enough shares of CCA stock to be able to vote and create 
resolutions at shareholder meetings. In 2011, Friedmann filed a resolution asking CCA to report on its 
efforts to reduce prisoner rape and sexual assaults in its facilities.
10
 Although the resolution received 
almost 20% of voting shares, it failed to pass (however, the Justice Department finally finalized the 2003 
Prison Rape Elimination Act only months after Friedmann’s resolution, which was covered by several 
major media outlets leading up to the finalization of the PREA in August 2012
11
). Friedmann also has 
filed resolutions that would benefit the investors and society at the same time. For instance, on November 
20, 2012, Friedmann filed a shareholder resolution asking CCA to disclose information regarding its 
REIT conversion, including how CCA planned to comply with the IRS rules which govern REITS, such 
as the limitation on REIT assets that can be held in taxable REIT subsidiaries (TRSs).
 12
 
The work of Alex Friedmann, Managing Editor of Prison Legal News, in 1998 identified a 
concrete example where a report of CCA irresponsibility appeared to take a direct hit on CCA stock, 
motivating further execution of this particular thesis. On July 28, 1998, six prisoners, including four 
convicted murderers, escaped from the CCA-operated Northeast Ohio Correctional Center in 
Youngstown, Ohio by cutting through two fences. The Warden Jimmy Turner blamed prison employee 
errors for the break-out, which he claimed were guards leaving or not paying attention to their designated 
areas and not responding fast enough to the motion sensor alarms. Within ten days of the incident, CCA 
stock fell 20% to a year low of $69 per share ($90 per share on day of incident). According to Alex 
Friedmann, financial analysts called it a “public relations problem.” 13  CCA later caught all of the 
escapees, and prices began slowly rising but only to drop again and not recover until later in the year, as 
you can see in the graph below. This study conducted a Google search concerning the incident, and it 
appears several major media outlets covered the prison breakout as well.  
                                                 
9
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Legal News September 15, 2013. https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2013/sep/15/prison-rape-elimination-act-
standards-finally-in-effect-but-will-they-be-effective/. 
12




 Friedmann, Alex. “Youngstown Break Out Leads to Political and Financial Fall Out.” Prison Legal News 
November 15, 1998. https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/1998/nov/15/youngstown-break-out-leads-to-political-
financial-fall-out/. 
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Northeast Ohio Correctional Center also experienced one of the most famous prison break-outs in 
CCA history on April 2, 2007, when an escapee escaped two guards by cutting plastic flex cuffs with toe 
nail clippers
14
 and took a hostage for three hours until the guards convinced him to surrender by offering 





CXW prices actually rose slightly in the months of April and May in 2007, showing no implications of 
this incident on CXW share prices or assistance from this incidence on CXW share prices. The 
Washington Post published news of the arrest of the escapee on the day of the incident, possibly 
benefiting CCA by stating it was a quickly solved matter.
16
 Here we see where an act of CCA 
irresponsibility concerning security was solved quickly convoluting conclusions of whether CCA would 
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17 It should be noted here that the quantitative findings for this research identified the CCA security issue count of 
reports as having a significant relationship to average stock price per share that month, where as reports of security 
issues rose stock price followed. Note that reports of security issues were counted (e.g. break outs), and not reports 
where the prisoners were caught; however, these events, as seen above, can often happen in the same month. 
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In addition to the media reportings of CCA irresponsibility identified in this research, NGOs 
often identify deaths and incidents in CCA facilities not reported on by the media. The following 
spreadsheet of inmate deaths under the watch of CCA from 1987 to present and documents of incidents in 
CCA facilities were compiled by Alex Friedmann of the Private Corrections Institute (PCI) after 
submitting FOIL (Freedom of Information Law) requests for Request for Proposal (RFP) documents 
submitted by CCA in the government contract application process. According to Friedmann, CCA 
stopped submitting these lists in 2008 after finding they were being released through public record 
requests. 
 
Prisoner Name Date of death State Facility Type Notes 
 Bryan K. Blackburn 2015 OK Davis Corr. Facility homicide beaten to death with food tray 
Jose de Jesus Deniz-Sahagun 2015 AZ Eloy Detention Center unknown 
  James Nicholson 2015 KY Lee Adjustment Center after an assault Vermont prisoner 
Tyrone Madden 2015 MS Tallahatchie Co. Corr. Facility medical CA inmate 
 Lawrence Dobbins 2014 TX Bartlett State Jail natural 
  Eric Grimm 2014 OK Davis Corr. Facility homicide strangled 
 Tory Czernicki 2014 OK Davis Corr. Facility homicide strangled 
 Jose Javier Hernandez-
Valencia 2014 TX Houston Processing Center medical 
  Peter George Carlysle 
Rockwell 2014 TX Houston Processing Center medical 
  Roland Fears 2014 AZ La Palma Corr. Center 
 
CDCR report 
Myron Dibenedetto 2014 OH Lake Erie Corr. Institution medical 
  Carl Howell 2014 OH Lake Erie Corr. Institution medical from Muckrock docs 
Michael J. Craney 2014 KS Leavenworth medical (preventable according to fed. Public defender Stephen Moss) 
Todd Bush 2014 OK North Fork homicide 
  Melvin Wright 2014 AZ Saguaro medical Hawaii prisoner, died on flight back to Hawaii 
Jeffrey T. Sills 2014 TN SCCF homicide 
  Gregory Morris Booten 2014 TN SCCF suicide letter received re death 
Steve Le 2014 MS Tallahatchie Co. Corr. Facility accident CA inmate 
 Brian Huff 2014 TN WCFA natural 
  Marcus D. Berthiaume 2013 FL Bay Correctional Facility natural 
  Jorge Garcia-Maldanado 2013 AZ Eloy Detention Center suicide 
  Elsa Guadalupe-Gonzales 2013 AZ Eloy Detention Center suicide 
  Michael P. McNaughton 2013 AZ Florence Corr. Center homicide 
  Julius A. Dean 2013 FL Graceville Correctional Facility natural 
  Dustin Henning 2013 TN HCCF unknown 
  Clyde Chambers 2013 TN HCCF unknown 
  Clemente N. Mponda 2013 TX Houston Processing Center unknown 
  Samuel Mendoza 2013 AZ La Palma Corr. Center 
 
CDCR report 
Ernest Gooden 2013 OH Lake Erie Corr. Institution medical from Muckrock docs 
I.V. Ivory 2013 TN MDF natural 
  Melvin Bell 2013 TX Mineral Wells natural 
  Jonathan Bush 2013 OK North Fork 
 
CDCR report 
Gerald Ewing 2013 TN SCCF homicide 
  Bobby D. Parker 2013 TN SCCF suicide 
  Raequayah Shropshire 2013 TN Silverdale Detention Facility medical 




Demond Flowers 2013 MS Wilkinson County Correctional Facility homicide During riot 
 Shebaa Green 2012 TX Dawson State Jail medical 
  Manuel Cota-Domingo 2012 AZ Eloy Detention Center natural diabetes 
 Alvin Martin 2012 TN HCCF natural 
  Floyd Perrow 2012 TN HCCF unknown 
  Dustin Bland 2012 AZ La Palma Corr. Center 
 
CDCR report 
Michael A. Nelson 2012 OH Lake Erie Corr. Institution medical overdose? 
Willie Anderson 2012 OH Lake Erie Corr. Institution medical / liver 
 
from Muckrock docs 
Duke Wagner 2012 OH Lake Erie Corr. Institution medical / liver 
 
from Muckrock docs 
Nicholas McNerney 2012 OK North Fork 
 
CDCR report 
Daniel Garrett 2012 OK North Fork 
 
CDCR report 
Ronald Harries 2012 TN SCCF unknown 
  Sergio Ramirez 2012 MS Tallahatchie Co. Corr. Facility 
 
CDCR report 
Santana Nunez 2012 MS Tallahatchie Co. Corr. Facility 
 
CDCR report 
Charles Carter 2012 TN WCFA unknown 
  Derek Criddle 2011 MS Delta Corr. Facility homicide 
  Victor Ramirez-Reyes 2011 NJ Elizabeth Detention Center natural Hypertensive and atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease 
Pablo Gracida-Conte 2011 AZ Eloy Detention Center medical Congestive heart failure 
Jeffery H. Tutton 2011 FL Graceville Correctional Facility natural 
  Fredrick Corlew 2011 TN HCCF natural 
  Matthew Henderson 2011 TN HCCF natural 
  Rocky Hunter 2011 TN HCCF natural 
  Ricardo Rojas-Martinez 2011 TX Houston Processing Center natural heart attack 
Juan Palomo-Rodriquez 2011 TX Houston Processing Center natural acute coronary disease 
Andres Valdez 2011 CO Kit Carson other (transport van accident) 
Leslie Wilson 2011 CO Kit Carson medical (transferred to state prison the day before he died) 
Miguel Angel Hernandez 2011 GA North Georgia Detention Center medical heart attack 
Gary Brown 2011 AZ Red Rock 
 
CDCR report 
Juan Gonzalez 2011 AZ Red Rock 
 
CDCR report 
Joseph L. Mixon 2010 FL Bay Correctional Facility suicide 
  Terrell Griswold 2010 CO Bent County Correctional Facility medical 
  Pamela D. Weatherby 2010 TX Dawson State Jail medical $437,500 settlement 
Ricky E. Gardner 2010 TN HCCF homicide 
  Clifford Thompson 2010 TN HCCF natural 
  Jimmy New 2010 TN HCCF natural 
  Eddie Moore 2010 MS Leflore County Jail medical 
  Leroy Woundedknee 2010 OK North Fork 
 
CDCR report 
Frederick Johnson 2010 OK North Fork 
 
CDCR report 
Bronson Nunuha 2010 AZ Saguaro homicide Hawaii prisoner housed in AZ 
Clifford Medina 2010 AZ Saguaro homicide Hawaii prisoner housed in AZ 
James Harris 2010 TN WCFA natural 
  Eric Henry 2010 TN WCFA natural 
  Geoffrey A. Scheid 2009 CO Bent County Correctional Facility suicide 
  
Joseph Curtis 2009 IN 
During transport by TransCor from KS to 
IN other heatstroke 
Charles Finch 2009 TN HCCF natural 
  Alan Parrigin 2009 TN HCCF natural 
  Carl Swaney 2009 TN HCCF natural 
  Leonardo Acosta 2009 AZ La Palma Corr. Center 
 
CDCR report 
William Williams 2009 TN MDF suicide 
  Wakus Benford 2009 TN MDF natural 
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John Jennings 2009 TN MDF natural 
  Jimmy Silvey 2009 OK North Fork 
 
CDCR report 
Julio Martinez 2009 CA San Diego Corr. Facility natural lymphatic cancer 
Paul Williams 2009 TN SCCF natural 
  Deandre Kimbrough 2009 TN SCCF suicide 
  Roberto Medina-Martinez 2009 GA Stewart Detention Center medical cardiac arrest 
Richard Fry 2009 MS Tallahatchie Co. Corr. Facility 
 
CDCR report 
Alan Young 2009 TN West Tennessee Detention Facility suicide 
  Leonard Odom 2009 GA Wheeler County Corr. Facility unknown 
  Thomas Detric Adderson 2009 TX Willacy Unit medical 
  Gregory Cole 2008 TX Bradshaw State Jail suicide 
  Ashleigh Shae Parks 2008 TX Dawson State Jail medical 
  Emmanuel Owusu 2008 AZ Eloy Detention Center suicide 
  Nail Yoursef Dawood 2008 AZ Eloy Detention Center natural coronary artery vasculitis 
Stefanie Rhaney 2008 FL Gadsden Correctional Facility natural 
  Brenda S. Carroll 2008 FL Gadsden Correctional Facility natural 
  Steve Grant 2008 TN HCCF natural 
  Terry Wayne Battle 2008 TN MDF medical 
  Gerald Townsend 2008 TN MDF homicide 
  David Drashner 2008 OK North Fork homicide 
  Beverly Ford Murphy 2008 KY Otter Creek medical 
  Joseph Alexie 2008 AZ Red Rock medical 
  John Alllen 2008 TN SCCF natural 
  Pedro Gumayagay 2008 GA Stewart Detention Center natural Metastic adenocarcinoma 
Robert Washington 2008 MS Tallahatchie Co. Corr. Facility medical 
  Jimmy Walker 2008 TN WCFA unknown 
  Jason Martin 2008 TN WCFA suicide 
  Calvin Lee McGee 2007 TX Bartlett State Jail natural 
  Ruben White 2007 TX Bartlett State Jail natural 
  Boubacar Bah 2007 NJ Elizabeth Detention Center medical traumatic brain injury 
Felix Franklin Rodriguez-
Torres 2007 AZ Eloy Detention Center medical cancer 
 Alton Gulley 2007 TN HCCF unknown 
  Carlos Somerville 2007 TN HCCF natural 
  Roger Todd 2007 TN HCCF natural 
  Bobby McDonald 2007 TN HCCF natural 
  Joseph Patterson 2007 TN HCCF natural 
  Larry Adams 2007 TN HCCF medical $70,000 settlement 
Edward Duritsky 2007 FL Hernando County Jail medical 
  Earl Covington 2007 TN MDF natural 
  Latasha Dorean Glover 2007 KY Otter Creek medical 
  Rusty Hightower 2007 AZ Red Rock unknown (found unresponsive in cell) 
Anthony David Bowman 2007 TN SCCF medical Sickle cell crisis; suit filed by mother 
James Perry 2007 TN SCCF natural 
  John Welch 2007 TN SCCF natural 
  Jimmy Bolden 2007 TN WCFA natural 
  Ricky Ware 2007 TN WCFA suicide 
  Jack Sherrill 2007 TN WCFA natural 
  Larry Culpepper 2007 TN WCFA natural 
  Anthony Kelly 2007 TN West Tennessee Detention Facility medical 




Torres 2006 AZ Eloy Detention Center medical ruptured arteriovenous malformation midbrain 
Lacey Crowe 2006 TN HCCF natural 
  Daniel Adams 2006 TN HCCF natural 
  Melvin Hicks 2006 TN HCCF natural 
  Geoffrey M. Conley 2006 FL Hernando County Jail suicide 
  John T. Wells 2006 FL Hernando County Jail medical 
  Truoc Tran 2006 FL Hernando County Jail suicide 
  Antonio Martinez-Rivas 2006 TX Houston Processing Center suicide 
  Brian Keith Allen 2006 IN Marion County Jail II medical 
  Charles Repass 2006 IN Marion County Jail II medical 
  Paul Davis 2006 TN MDF natural 
  Lorenzo Easly 2006 TX Mineral Wells natural 
  Yusif Osman 2006 CA San Diego Corr. Facility natural Coronary Artery Vasculitis 
James Miller 2006 TN SCCF natural 
  Willard Rednower 2006 TN SCCF suicide 
  Lawrence Ware, Jr. 2006 TN WCFA suicide 
  James Cox 2006 TN WCFA natural 
  Barry Morris 2006 TN WCFA natural 
  James T. Sly 2005 FL Bay County Jail suicide 
  Adam Gene Lippert 2005 OK Cimarron Corr. Facility homicide 
  Maya Nand 2005 AZ Eloy Detention Center medical cardiac arrest 
Elias Lopez Ruelas 2005 AZ Eloy Detention Center medical cirrhosis 
 Juan Salazar-Gomez 2005 AZ Eloy Detention Center suicide 
  Emma J. Nobles 2005 FL Gadsden Correctional Facility natural 
  Roy King 2005 TN HCCF natural 
  Terry Vestal 2005 TN HCCF unknown 
  David Smith 2005 TN HCCF unknown 
  William Collins 2005 TN HCCF natural 
  Daniel Ray Warren 2005 FL Hernando County Jail suicide 
  Reinaldo Prado-Arencilia 2005 TX Houston Processing Center medical seizure disorder 
Walter Alvarez-Esquivel 2005 TX Laredo Processing Center medical Acute Hemorrhagic Cerebral Vascular Accident 
Gerald Smith 2005 TN MDF natural 
  Carlton Sloss 2005 TN MDF natural Denial of medical care; $650,000 settlement 
Tean Bowens 2005 TX Mineral Wells natural 
  Sarah Ah Mau 2005 KY Otter Creek medical 
  Roberto Ledesman-Guerrero 2005 CA San Diego Corr. Facility natural Cardiopulmonary Arrest 
Ignacio Sarabia-Vallasenor 2005 CA San Diego Corr. Facility natural cardiac arrest 
William Long 2005 TN SCCF natural 
  Sonny Porter 2005 TN SCCF natural 
  Felipe Gonzalez 2005 OK Tulsa Jail suicide 
  Terry Miller 2005 TN WCFA natural 
  William Henry Cantor 2004 FL Bay County Jail suicide 
  Stacy Allan Tolbert 2004 FL Bay County Jail medical 
  Jonathan Magbie 2004 DC Correctional Treatment Facility (DC) medical 
  Jose Lopez-Lara 2004 AZ Eloy Detention Center medical Cerebral Infarct 
Mary L. Perry 2004 FL Gadsden Correctional Facility natural 
  Glen Miller 2004 TN HCCF natural 
  Maria Solis-Perez 2004 TX Houston Processing Center medical 
  Bobby James 2004 TN MDF natural 
  Ellen Walker 2004 TN MDF natural 
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Billy Barrett 2004 TN MDF natural 
  Estelle Richardson 2004 TN MDF homicide (4 CCA guards charged; charges later dropped) 
Floyd Campbell 2004 TN SCCF natural 
  Kevin Scott 2004 TN Shelby Training Center suicide 
  Sondria Allen 2004 OK Tulsa Jail accident durg related 
Michael Andrew Jones 2004 OK Tulsa Jail suicide 
  James L. Kirk, Jr. 2004 TN WCFA suicide 
  Lemoyn Sherron 2004 TN WCFA natural 
  Anthony Jones 2004 TN WCFA natural 
  Ronald Brock 2004 TN WCFA natural 
  Byron Lester 2003 FL Bay Correctional Facility natural 
  Francis M. Hendrickson 2003 FL Gadsden Correctional Facility natural 
  Terrence Morton 2003 TN HCCF natural 
  Joseph Brooks 2003 TN HCCF natural 
  Ark Collier 2003 TN HCCF natural 
  William Hudson 2003 TN MDF natural 
  Joseph Gant 2003 TN SCCF natural 
  James R. Boyd 2003 TN SCCF natural 
  Alex Bass 2003 TN Shelby Training Center suicide 
  Chad Littles 2002 FL Bay County Jail homicide 
  Justin Sturgis 2002 FL Bay County Jail medical 
  Antonio Lewis Franklin 2002 FL Citrus County Jail medical 
  Benjamin David Brown 2002 DC Correctional Treatment Facility (DC) medical 
  Gail M. Mikell 2002 FL Gadsden Correctional Facility natural 
  Mark Jelsema 2002 TN HCCF natural 
  David Greene 2002 TN HCCF natural 
  Bennie Welch 2002 TN HCCF natural 
  Pedro Rodriquez 2002 TN HCCF natural 
  Laren Sims Jordan 2002 FL Hernando County Jail suicide 
  Daniel Williams 2002 TN MDF natural 
  Tammy Wynn 2002 TN MDF natural 
  Brenda Wiggins 2002 TN MDF accident (hit by train while on work release) 
George Burke 2002 TN MDF natural 
  Lewis Collier 2002 TN SCCF natural 
  Lindsey Lightner, Jr. 2002 TN Silverdale Detention Facility natural settlement 
 Scott Ray Dickens 2002 OK Tulsa Jail suicide 
  Etheridge Hughes 2001 FL Bay Correctional Facility natural 
  Conrado Mestas Ochoa 2001 TX Eden Detention Center unknown 
  Iulai Amani 2001 AZ Florence Corr. Center medical 
  Mary A. Jimerson 2001 FL Gadsden Correctional Facility natural 
  Jenny L. Singleton 2001 FL Gadsden Correctional Facility natural 
  Mary L. Bayer 2001 FL Gadsden Correctional Facility natural 
  Jeffrey Buller 2001 CO Kit Carson medical 
  Timothy Johnston 2001 TN MDF accident (multi-drug interaction) 
Reginald Rose  2001 TN MDF natural 
  Thomas Harris 2001 TN SCCF homicide 
  Dowell Shannon 2001 TN SCCF natural 
  Calvin Lamy 2001 NM Torrance County Detention Facility suicide 
  Shane M. Spencer 2001 OK Tulsa Jail medical 
  Marvin Borjas Diaz-Perez 2001 TN West Tennessee Detention Facility medical 
  Ruby DeVaughn 2000 FL Gadsden Correctional Facility natural 
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Loraine Days 2000 FL Gadsden Correctional Facility natural 
  Wanda E. Dennis 2000 FL Gadsden Correctional Facility natural 
  Connie Y. Miller 2000 FL Gadsden Correctional Facility natural 
  Jacquelyn D. Murray 2000 FL Gadsden Correctional Facility natural 
  Isaac Lyons III 2000 TN HCCF unknown 
  Michael Schrecongost 2000 CO Kit Carson overdose 
  Edmond Corley 2000 TN MDF natural 
  Joan Gary 2000 TN MDF natural 
  Merlin Lee Foster 2000 OK Tulsa Jail medical 
  Cory Adam Morris 2000 OK Tulsa Jail suicide 
  Leonia Sanchez Arriaga 2000 OK Tulsa Jail medical (head injury after assault) 
Donnell Reed 1999 DC Correctional Treatment Facility (DC) other during escape attempt 
Steven W. Lawson 1999 TN HCCF natural 
  James Barner 1999 TN HCCF natural 
  Candy Jones 1999 TN MDF unknown  
  Paul Reed 1999 TN MDF unknown 
  James Lebron Hurt 1999 TN Silverdale Detention Facility suicide 
  Reginald Edmonds 1998 TN HCCF suicide 
  Paula Richardson 1998 
 
MWCC (Australia) suicide 
  Ralph Carpenter 1998 TN SCCF natural  (guards reportedly ignored his complaints of chest pains) 
Douglas Mattes 1998 TN SCCF suicide 
  Geronimo Gonzales-
Quintanilla 1998 NM Torrance County Detention Facility medical (after being restrained) 
Bill Hambly 1998 NM Torrance County Detention Facility homicide 
  Gregory Allen Pope Sr. 1998 OK Tulsa Jail medical 
  Corey Smith 1998 TN West Tennessee Detention Facility homicide 
  Stanley R. Rice 1998 OH Youngstown medical 
  Perry Clay 1998 OH Youngstown medical 
  Bryson Chisley 1998 OH Youngstown homicide 
  Derrick David 1998 OH Youngstown homicide 
  William V. Christian 1997 TN HCCF homicide 
  Tony Sams 1997 TN MDF unknown 
  Charles Edward Guffey 1997 OK Tulsa Jail medical 
  Michael Cephus 1997 OH Youngstown medical 
  John Cowley 1996 
 
HM Prison Blakenhurst (UK) suicide 
  Bryant Donnie 1996 TN MDF unknown 
  Kenneth Brakefield 1996 TN MDF unknown 
  Ronald Coleman 1996 TN MDF natural 
  Alton Manning 1995 
 
HM Prison Blakenhurst (UK) other death while being restrained 
Hugh Wayne Martin 1995 TX Venus Pre-release Detention Center overdose $60,000 settlement 
Rosalind Bradford 1987 TN Silverdale Detention Facility medical 
  Marjorie Annmarie Bell 2014 CA San Diego Corr. Facility medical Sudden cardiac death 
Charles Emesibe 2015 TN HCCF unknown from TDOC 
Christopher Robinson 2015 TN HCCF natural from TDOC 
Jackie Coffman 2015 TN WCFA natural from TDOC 
Lewis Hamilton 2015 OK Davis Corr. Facility homicide 
stabbed http://www.tulsaworld.com/homepagelatest/inmate-apparently-stabbed-to-death-at-holdenville-private-prison/article_14a5db6f-6df3-572e-985a-
65f3e75adbbf.html 
Jonathan Namauleg 2015 AZ Saguaro Corr. Center homicide http://www.hawaiinewsnow.com/story/29739020/hawaii-man-found-dead-in-arizona-prison-cell-cold-case-convict-investigated  
Anthony Fulwilder 2015 OK Cimarron Corr. Facility homicide 
  Micheal Mayden 2015 OK Cimarron Corr. Facility homicide 
  Kyle Tifee 2015 OK Cimarron Corr. Facility homicide 
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Christopher Tignor 2015 OK Cimarron Corr. Facility homicide 
  Michael Flor 2012 MT Crossroads Corr. Facility medical http://www.tribtown.com/view/story/a783c19bf06349f492c8735ad3924daf/MT--Inmate-Death-Lawsuit  
Joseph Barela 2013 NM Torrance County Detention Facility suicide http://www.dailyjournal.net/view/story/12e2dec1cee649cc8f640321b9270d37/NM--Jail-Drugs-Lawsuit  
 
PENDING INMATE DEATHS 
      Carlos Aguirre-Venegas  
   Jason Owens 
     Daniel Simmons   
   
unknown 262500 settlement 
Arnold Everett 
    Bill Audie Hamby 
     John Judson Patterson 
   Robert Triplett 
   Tommy Lee Poe 
   Reginald Garrett 
    Bernard Pete 
   Walter Thurman 
   Harvey 
   Sims 
     
